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During the past two years numerous attacks have been struck at
the sellers of tobacco products. Rather than attack them directly,
however, the target has been their advertising. Not only does this
raise significant first amendment questions, the logic behind these
efforts is defective. Central to each action is the question of how
effective the Surgeon General's warnings in advertisements are or
can be, yet very little consideration or research has been dedicated
to answering this question.
INTRODUCTION
The promotion of cigarettes has charred a long and cloudy path
through the annals of advertising regulation, from a time when
consumers were promised that cigarettes would cure or prevent a
myriad of ills to the present hostile and litigious atmosphere which
threatens both retribution on manufacturers of cigarettes and total
abolition of their advertising. The ten months from October 1985
through July 1986, alone, evidenced a rapid turn of events that now
dangles a singed cloud over the future of tobacco advertising; a
cloud that could well leave tobacco stains on the first amendment
freedoms of the entire advertising industry.
The year 1985 ended with a fifteen-year-old health warning on
cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements being replaced by
a new series of four alternating warnings.' This was almost imme-
1. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2204 (1984).
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diately followed by a proclamation of war by the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the Surgeon General of the United States,
targeting cigarette makers and their advertising as the enemy.2 At
just about the same time a series of court decisions added new
dimensions to the presence of health warnings in cigarette advertise-
ments. 3 During the spring of 1986, a smokeless tobacco act was
passed, requiring health warnings on labels and advertising of "chew-
ing tobacco" and other smokeless tobacco products, while at the
same time banning their advertising from radio and television.4 When
summer arrived, a bill was introduced in Congress asking it to
exorcise tobacco advertising from all media presently permitted to
carry it. 5 Only three weeks later, on July 1, 1986, an astonishing
and, to some, frightening decision was rendered by the United States
Supreme Court, with implications which forced advertisers to recon-
sider the seriousness of the pending Congressional action. 6 That
decision, as a result, laid the foundation for Congressional subcom-
mittee hearings on the proposed tobacco ad ban, which began three
weeks later. 7
Many of the consequences of these recent activities are yet un-
known, but the potential fallout for tobacco manufacturers, the
advertising profession, and first amendment rights generally, may be
ominous. In the discussion that follows, the nature of the controversy
will be outlined, the legal situs of tobacco advertising will be explored,
and potential solutions to the conflict will be considered. This dis-
cussion will begin by providing some form to the controversy, through
a brief review of the history of cigarettes and the regulatory efforts
previously aimed at their advertising.
RISING FRoM TmH ASHES OF THE PAST
A. 400 Years, B.S.G. (Before Surgeon General)
Today's conflict over the marketing of cigarettes grows out of a
2. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, A Cigarette Ad Smoke Screen, NATION'S Busur~ss, Feb. 1986,
at 6; Molotsky, A.M.A. Expected to Call for Ban on Cigarette Ads, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1985, at A24, col. 1.
3. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Tenn. 1985); Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
789 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1986).
4. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-252,
100 Stat. 30 (1986).
5. Health Protection Act of 1986, H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
6. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968
(1986).
7. See, e.g., Colford, Tobacco Critics Start Battle For Ad Restrictions, ADvERTISwIN
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busy history of debate and concern over the health effects of these
products and of the sales techniques used by their makers. While the
heat of this debate is newly kindled, it was ignited hundreds of years
ago.
Tobacco was introduced to the civilized world a little more than
four centuries ago, in 1560, when the French Ambassador to Por-
tugal, Jean Nicot, announced that he had acquired a remarkable
American herb that had wondrous curative powers. As the natural
consequence of this discovery, Nicot was honored by having this
healing substance named after him: Nicotiana (the scientific name
for tobacco)." This quickly proved to be a rather dubious honor.
In spite of Nicot's early health claims for tobacco, it was very
quickly suspect as a harmful substance, and was far from being
loved by all. Less than fifty years after its discovery, tobacco was
described in an essay by James I of England as:
a custome lothsome to the Eye, hateful to the Nose, harmful to
the Braine, dangerous to the Lungs, and, in the black stinking
Fume thereof, nearest resembling the horrible Stygian Smoke of the
Pit that is bottomless. 9
By the mid-1800s scientific evidence began to appear which seemed
to disconfirm the beneficial qualities of tobacco."0 Early in the 1900s
medical research began to show that beyond there being no medicinal
benefits, there might actually be a causal relationship between smok-
ing and illness."1 Anti-cigarette sentiments reached an early peak in
1913. Beginning at that time, small groups of social reformers sought
anti-cigarette legislation in nine southern and western states. By 1929,
however, this movement waned.' 2
AGE, July 21, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Gloede, Lotsa Smoke, No Fire. Ban Tobacco Ads? Marketers
Stay Cool, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
8. FRrrSCHLER, SMoKING AND PoLrrcs: POLICYMAKING AND THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
(2d Ed. 1975) [referred to hereinafter as SMOKING Am PoLmcs]. Smoking of other substances
was practiced long before that time, for medicinal purposes. Tobacco, however, was native to
the Americas, and its original users were Indians. The term "tobacco" derived from an Indian
pipe called a "taboca." Christopher Columbus and his crew were the first Europeans to
experience it, but it was Nicot who introduced it to France. TBE CONSUMER UNION, The
Consumer Union Report on Smoking and the Public Interest 122 (1963) [referred to hereinafter
as Consumer Union Report].
9. From A Counterblaste to Tobacco (1604), quoted in EDITORIA RESEARCH REPORTS,
Consumer Protection Gains and Setbacks 70 (1978). This habit was particularly hazardous to
health in Russia during the 17th Century. The Czar of All the Russias threatened early tobacco
users with having their noses slit for a first offense and with death for repeated violations.
Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 123, 176.
10. SMOKINo AND PoLmcs, supra note 8, at 7.
11. Id. at 17.
12. SINCLAIR, THE ERA oF SUccEss 180 (1964).
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As that initial attack on smoking ended, several scientific or quasi-
scientific studies were announced establishing a connection between
smoking and cancer. One English physician reported in a British
medical journal in 1927 that in nearly every case of lung cancer of
which he had personal knowledge the patient was a regular smoker.' 3
In 1936 two American physicians announced in the Journal of the
American Medical Association that of 135 men with lung cancer they
had examined, fully 90% of them were "chronic smokers.' ' 4
While medical evidence mounted, the cigarette manufacturers were
perfecting their sales pitches. The growing consciousness of the tie
between smoking and health caused manufacturers to try defusing
public concerns by extolling purported medicinal advantages of cig-
arettes-advantages which apparently only the makers believed to
exist.' 5 Camel claimed to aid digestion, relieve fatigue, and never
irritate the throat.' 6 Kool claimed to be a shield against colds,' 7 as
did Philip Morris.'8
13. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 25.
14. Id. at 25.
15. "When unfavorable research findings were released, the manufacturers found ways
to discredit and obliterate them in the public consciousness through more glamorous adver-
tisements and intensified lobbying." SMOKING AND PoLmcs, supra note 8, at 18.
16. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 145.
17. Id. at 146.
18. Figure 1 depicts a typical Philip Morris advertisement from the 1940s. It can be seen,
in Figure 2, that such health claims were not unique to that particular brand.
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FIGURE 1: This advertisement appeared in Time magazine in May, 1944. Claims
of curative powers were not uncommon at this time.
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FIGURE 2: This was the back cover of Time magazine on January 14, 1946.
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Several regulatory actions against cigarette firms occurred in the
early 1940s. In 1942 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took
action against Lucky Strikes and Pall Malls, followed by actions
against several other brands. 9 Although the FTC saw a few successes
from these attempts to enforce some modicum of honesty, 20 it was
generally impotent in these attacks on cigarette manufacturers. By
the time the FTC staff investigated a particular advertising campaign,
recommended action to the Commissioners, filed a complaint, and
then followed it through administrative due process, the ads in
question had already seen the end of their usefulness. 21 Manufacturers
would simply commence a new campaign with different but similarly
questionable claims.
In 1952, the FTC, as the result of a complaint filed ten years
earlier, ordered Philip Morris to stop claiming that this brand was
recommended by "outstanding nose and throat specialists. ' ' 22 Philip
Morris responded the following year by claiming that only its brand
was entirely free of the throat irritation found in all other leading
brands.2z Clearly, this was not terribly different from the claim
already determined to be deceptive.
By the mid-1950s activity surrounding cigarette advertising began
to intensify. In 1953 the AMA made its first entry into the controversy
by banning tobacco advertising from all of its publications.4 In 1955
the FTC adopted industry guides prohibiting cigarette sellers from
19. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 145.
20. Some firms did agree to change their practices. In 1942, for example Brown &
Williamson agreed to cease advertising that Kools "give extra protection" or are "excellent
safeguards" during cold months, or by stating or implying that they constitute a remedy or
protection from colds. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 34 F.T.C. 1689 (1942). A brand
called "Juleps" was advertised with the phrase, "Remember Juleps, Forget Your Cough."
The FTC decided that this implied that the cigarettes were a treatment or remedy for coughs,
and the manuf.-cturer agreed to stop using the "forget your cough" phrase. Penn Tobacco
Co., 34 F.T.C. 1636 (1942).
21. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 145. This is a common criticism of FTC
prosecutions, since its primary power is ordering advertisers to cease and desist from making
certain claims, rather than punishing them for making knowingly deceptive claims. A typical
advertising campaign is used for only a matter of months before it must be replaced with a
fresh campaign, but a typical time-span from the start of an investigation until an FTC action
is completed in four years. Cox, FELUAETH, & ScHtzrz, "THE NADER REPORT" ON TH13
FaDEAL TADE CoMMISSION 72 (1969). A challenged ad was little more than disposable rubbish
to the manufacturer by the time the FTC was ready to force the issue. This weakness has
largely been cured with the advent of corrective powers to act "retroactively" upon prior
claims. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978).
22. Philip Morris, 49 F.T.C. 703 (1952).
23. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 146.
24. Smoking and Health Council on Scientific Affairs, 243 J. A.M.A. 779 (1980). In
1968, the AMA House of Delegates again entered this debate by adopting a resolution calling
for the AMA to take a strong stand against smoking, using every means at its disposal. Id.
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stating explicitly or implicitly in their advertising that there was medical
approval of cigarette smoking.2
The year 1957 saw a Congressional investigation begin, concerning
claims about filter-tips on cigarettes. The House subcommittee as-
sessing this situation, chaired by Representative John A. Blatnik of
Minnesota, issued a report charging that cigarette manufacturers had
deceived the public. The report went on to accuse the FTC of failing
"its statutory duty ... to approach the problems of false and
misleading advertising with vigor and diligence. ' 26 Even though the
Commission tried futilely to fight the tobacco giants, its relative
inadequacy was viewed as a lack of diligence.
The following year the tobacco industry took counter-measures to
defend against this groundswell of anti-tobacco sentiment. A lobbying
and public relations group, called The Tobacco Institute, Inc., was
formed to represent tobacco interests before the government and the
consumers. 27 The industry appeared to be readying for a fight. Four
years later that fight came to fruition.
B. Enter, the Surgeon General
For the tobacco industry, 1962 was an infamous year. It was in
that year the Royal College of Physicians, in London, published a
crucifying paper which left little question that a causal relationship
existed between cigarette use and lung cancer.28 It was also in that
year the Surgeon General of the United States, Luther L. Terry,
formed an Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health. The first
meeting of that Committee was held on November 9, 1962, and its
report was released just fourteen months later on January 11, 1964.29
More than fifteen bills were introduced in Congress between 1962
and 1964 aimed at either restricting cigarette sales or mandating the
use of some form of health warnings to protect the public.10 In the
25. 20 Fed. Reg. 332 (1955).
26. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 186-87.
27. SmoKING AND PoLImcs, supra note 8, at 23.
28. Royal College of Physicians of London, Smoking and Health - Summary and Report
of the Royal College of Physicians of London on Smoking in Relation to Cancer of the Lung
and Other Diseases (1962). The major conclusions of this report were: "Cigarette smoking is
a cause of lung cancer and bronchitis, and probably contributes to the development of coronary
heart disease and various other less common diseases. It delays healing of gastric and duodenal
ulcers." AnvisoRY Comm. TO THE SuRGEoN GEN. OF THE PuB. HEaLT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SmOKNo AND -EALT 8 (1964).
29. ADVISORY COMMMrE TO THE SURGEoN GEN. OF Tm PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SmoKrlo AD HEALTH 8 (1964).
30. S 0KI AND PoLitics, supra note 8, at 26.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
first set of legislative hearings after the Surgeon General's Report
was released, held before the Senate Commerce Committee, the
Tobacco Institute paraded thirty-eight distinguished physicians, sur-
geons, and research scientists past the Committee to testify that in
their respected opinions the report was inaccurate." Michael Pert-
schuk, who later became Chairman of the FTC, states, "[The
Tobacco Institute and their law firm, Covington and Burling, had
combed the scientific universe to discover these thirty-eight. They
were not representative. They were indeed, as one research scientist
described them, a remnant of the 'Flat Earth Society.' "32
Before Congress acted upon these bills, the FTC acted with the
"diligence" it had previously been criticized as lacking. In 1964 it
promulgated a trade regulation rule requiring that all cigarette ads
and packages display a warning that cigarette smoking is dangerous
to health.33 That ruling was to have taken effect on January 1, 1965.
Ironically, the Commission was accused of overstepping its powers
and acting unconstitutionally.34 It voluntarily suspended the cigarette
rule pending hearings in Congress, and on July 27, 1965, Congress
passed its own rule on cigarette advertising and labeling.35 That act
made it unlawful to manufacture, import, or package cigarettes for
sale in the United States without each package bearing the notice:
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."
It, unlike the FTC's now preempted rule, required no such label in
advertisements, and specifically prohibited the FTC from exercising
its rulemaking powers against cigarette advertising.36 The Tobacco
Institute's parade of witnesses and other lobbying efforts apparently
had some influence.
Two years later, in 1967, the FTC issued a report to Congress
evaluating the effectiveness of the required labeling in curtailing
cigarette consumption.37 The Commission announced that the labeling
31. PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER
MovEnmNT 65 (1982).
32. Id. at 66.
33. Trade Reg. Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964).
34. SMOKING AND PoLITcs, supra note 8, at 13.
35. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 39-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965). As a result, the FTC withdrew its Trade Regulation Rule. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7939, at
12,921 (FTC 1965).
36. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965). The FTC was later returned its rulemaking power regarding cigarette advertising, but
was then required to give Congress six months notice of any plans to adopt a trade regulation
rule affecting cigarettes. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222,
84 Stat. 87 (1970).
37. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 50,174, at 55, 289 (FTC 1967). This report, and a similar report
by Health, Education, and Welfare, both appear at H.R. REP. No. 91-566, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 3-6 (1969).
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had little or no effect on the public's attitude toward smoking, except
that there had been some movement to brands with lower tar and
nicotine. Further action, it determined, was necessary.
In 1970 Congress amended the act to make a less ambiguous
warning. This new warning now stated: "Warning: The Surgeon
General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to
Your Health." ' 38 That notice was extended from package labeling to
advertising in 1972, by an "agreement" between the FTC and the
six major cigarette manufacturers in the United States.39 At the time
of these changes, however, a collateral attack on cigarette advertising
was being undertaken by a New York lawyer.
C. Banzhaf Leads the Ban
Three cigarette commercials were aired on WCBS-TV in New York,
on November 24, 1966, as others had regularly. These particular
commercials, though, were singled-out for special attention by John
F. Banzhaf, III, a young attorney. A few days later, on December
1, he petitioned the television station for equal time, to present views
about the advisability of smoking which were not portrayed in those
commercials. 40 The station's general manager felt that opposing views
were adequately covered by Cancer Society ads and news reports, so
he denied Banzhaf's demand. Banzhaf's response to this denial was
a complaint to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The FCC followed through by .holding that, while precisely equal
time was not justified, the "fairness doctrine ' 41 applies to commer-
cials, and that cigarette advertising raises "a substantial controversial
issue of public importance" sufficient to require a station to permit
broadcast time to present views opposing those of the cigarette
advertisers. 42 Banzhaf appealed that finding, hoping to secure equal
38. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970).
39. Lorillard, 80 F.T.C. 455 (1972), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1115 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
2237 (1976). This case involved the enforcement of six cease and desist consent orders, involving
the six manufacturers producing about 99 percent of the cigarettes made in the United States.
527 F.2d, at 1116.
40. See Lynd, Branzhaf v. FCC: Public Interest and the Fairness Doctrine, 23 FED. COM.
B.J. 39 (1969). See also Wuliger, The Constitutional Rights of Puffery: Commercial Speech
and the Cigarette Broadcast Advertising Ban, 36 FED. CoM. L.J. 1 (1984); Welkowitz, Smoke
in the Air: Commercial Speech and Broadcasting, 7 CaRDozo L. R-v. 47 (1985).
41. See, e.g., Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 25 R.R. 1901 (1941);
Applicability of Fairness Doctrine in Handling Controversial Lssues of Public Importance, 2
R.R.2d 1901 (1964). As the FCC first noted in Thomas W. Wilson, I1 R.R. 231 (1946): "....
the general principle underlying the duty of station licensees is that there be fairness and
objectivity in making time available for the discussion of all sides of controversial issues of
public importance." Id., at 232.
42. WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, aff'd on rehearing, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967). The FCC
noted in its opinion that cigarette smoking had recently been shown to be a menace to health,
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time for anti-smoking spokespersons, and appeals were also filed by
the Tobacco Institute and others. The court of appeals affirmed the
FCC decision in toto.43 The result: so long as broadcasters continued
to accept cigarette commercials, they must allocate a reasonable
amount of time for anti-cigarette counter-advertising. 44
Over the next couple of years the airwaves were profuse with point-
counterpoint in the cigarette ad battle. The goal presumably sought
by Banzhaf, to adversely impact cigarette consumption, seemed to
be realized. A drop in cigarette use did occur. 45 Judge J. Skelly
Wright, in 1971, observed:
[A]fter Banzhaf, these advertisements triggered the anti-smoking
messages which were having a devastating effect on cigarette con-
sumption. Thus the individual tobacco companies could not stop
advertising for fear of losing their competitive position; yet for
every dollar they spent to advance their product, they forced the
airing of more anti-smoking advertisements and hence lost more
customers."
The tobacco industry was pinned in a catch-22. If they stopped
promoting, they would lose customers to other brands, but if they
continued to advertise the entire industry would lose customers. Either
way, their sales were destined to dwindle. The only plausible response
was for the entire industry to stop using broadcast advertising, since
the fairness doctrine did not extend to other media. Of course, if
the manufacturers collaborated in a withdrawal en masse from the
airwaves, they might have been vulnerable to legal attack based upon
the antitrust laws. 47 Consequently, it was the cigarette makers, them-
selves, that lobbied for and ultimately obtained a legislative ban,
prohibiting tobacco from being advertised on television or radio.48
and that very fact made it a controversial issue of public importance, thereby making cigarette
advertisements a proper subject of the fairness doctrine.
43. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
44. Although equal time was found to be unnecessary, a "safe" allocation of time for
counter-ads was suggested to be about one counter-advertisement for every three cigarette
advertisements. Leventhal, Caution: Cigarette Commercials May Be Hazardous To Your License
- The New Aspect of Fairness, 22 FED. COM. B.J. 55, 94 (1968).
45. Warner, The Effects of the Anti-Smoking Campaign on Cigarette Consumption, 67
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 645 (July 1977); Hamilton, The Demand for Cigarettes: Advertising, the
Health Scene, and the Cigarette Advertising Ban, 54 Rnv. EcoN. & STATisTics 401 (Nov.
1972). Hamilton estimated that the deterrent effect of the counter advertising was almost six
times more powerful than the sales stimulus caused by the cigarette ads. The estimate, however,
is disputed by the FTC. FEDERAL TRADE CoMrssioN, STAFF REPORT ON CONStmSER REsPONSES
TO CiGARETrE HEALTH INFORMATiON 3 (1979).
46. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright,
J. dissenting), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
47. Id. at 585 n.10.
48. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970).
This is a somewhat oversimplified explanation. Even before the Banzhaf decision had time to
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The ban was subsequently challenged by six broadcasting companies
that were miffed about losing the business of the cigarette advertisers,
in Capital Broadcasting Company v. Mitchell,49 but the restriction
was upheld.
This was the last major chess-move in the tobacco advertising
dispute for over a decade.50 The next thrust was by the FTC, and it
was quickly followed with an exchange of legal blows.
THE NEW HEAT WAVE
A. The Warnings
The FTC made productive use of the lull that followed Capital
Broadcasting. It produced reams of reports on the tobacco industry.51
As a part of those investigations, the Commission staff studied the
efficacy of the Surgeon General's warning, which had appeared in
ads and on packages since 1970.52 The study found that the warning
did little to apprise the public of the true hazards of smoking. 53 The
FTC, as a consequence, proposed a potentially more effective rota-
tional series of warnings.54
In 1984 the federal code which demanded the long-used health
warning was amended to require four alternatively worded warnings.
As of October 12, 1985, the new warnings, which provide more
specific information than their predecessors, began appearing in both
labeling and advertising.55 This newest law requires each manufacturer
make a measurable impact, FTC Commissioner Elman had argued for banning cigarette ads
from the airwaves. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. #50,174 (FTC 1967).
49. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). Judge Wright
attached a scathing dissent, in which he stated, "[t]he passage of the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969 marked a dramatic legislative coup for the cigarette industry." 333 F.
Supp. at 589 (Wright, J. dissenting).
50. This is not to suggest that there was no activity. The FTC was busied doing research
and publishing reports on the tobacco industry. During the mid-1970s its "diligence" in
investigating the tobacco industry resulted in some publicity when one cigarette manufacturer
dumped 14,000 pounds of documents on the front steps of the Commission in order to ridicule
the agency's "bully" methods. PERTScHUK, supra note 31, at 85 (1982). An amendment to
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, in 1973, extended the ban of advertising
to "little cigars." Pub. L. No. 93-109, § 3, 87 Stat. 352 (1973).
51. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BRAND PERFORMANCE I THE CiaaR_-rra
INDUsTRY AND THE ADVANTAGE OF EARLY ENTRY, 1913-73 (1979); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
REPORT OF "TAR" AND NIcoTiN CONTENT OF Ta SMOKE OF 176 VARIETIs oF CIGARETTES
(1979); FEDERAL TRADE COMMIuSSlON, STAFF REPORT ON CoNsUMEaR RESPONSES TO CIGARETTE
HEALTH INFORMATION (1979); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE
ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION (1981).
52. See FEDERAL TEADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
INVESTIGATION (1981) (evaluation).
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at Appendix D.
55. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2204 (1984)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331- 39).
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to rotate the following sequence of warnings on a quarterly basis in
accordance with a plan approved by the FTC:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Can-
cer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth
Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide. 6
The purpose of these new messages is to make the warning more
effective. Obviously, if this is successful, it marks a major strike
against the tobacco industry.
At the end of February, 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986.17 For the first
time, the broadcast advertising ban and health warnings were ex-
tended to a tobacco product other than cigarettes.58 This Act became
effective in August of 1986.
Congress took steps to provide a new system of warnings. It also
extended them from cigarettes to smokeless tobacco, after 21 years
of warnings in labeling of the former. The operative question, then,
is: Will the new warnings be effective?59 The answer to that question
is central to the justification of these legislative actions, as it is to
other challenges to tobacco advertising arising at about the same
time.
B. The Lawsuits
A second, though collateral, attack recently experienced by the
tobacco industry came by way of private lawsuits. This is not a new
threat! 0 Suits against manufacturers, aimed at creating liability for
lung cancer or other health maladies allegedly derived from cigarette
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a).
57. Pub. L. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986).
58. The required warnings are the following, and must be rotated in a manner similar to
those now used for cigarettes:
"WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER,"
"WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH
LOSS," or
"WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIGA-
RETTES."
59. See infra, text accompanying notes 208-61.
60. An early, but thorough, treatment of death or disability lawsuits against the manu-
facturers of cigarettes appears in Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51
Cosumi L.Q. 678 (1966).
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use, have been frequent during the past quarter-century, 61 and are
extremely popular today. 62
The very first lung cancer-cigarette case brought to trial by a victim
occured in 1955. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers,63 the plaintiffs
action rested heavily upon advertising claims made by the tobacco
firm many years earlier. One cited ad was a 1934 newspaper pro-
motion for Chesterfields, promising, "A good cigarette can cause no
ills and cure no ailments ... but it gives you a lot of pleasure,
peace of mind and comfort." 64 Pritchard lost the case. In the end,
the court found that the manufacturer was not negligent, that it had
made no express warranties, and that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of using this product.6.
Unlike those early cases, which turned solely upon the proof of
warranty, negligence, intentional misrepresentation,66 or strict liabil-
ity,67 the most recent cases have asked a somewhat different question:
Do the Surgeon General's Warnings, which were implemented to
protect the health of consumers, act as a shield from liability for the
manufacturer? In other words, who were the warnings meant to
protect? Strangely enough, even when cigarette opponents were ini-
tially fighting for inclusions of health warnings in cigarette labels
and advertisements during the early 1960s, some parties voiced a
concern that the warnings might benefit the manufacturers more than
the consumers. Those concerns, however, were lost in the short-term
goals of reducing consumption. 68
The first such case to frontally address this issue was decided on
December 18, 1985. In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Com-
pany,69 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee faced a claim by Mr. Floyd Roysdon that his severe
peripheral vascular disease was the proximate result of many years
61. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds, 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Philip
Morris Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers, 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
62. In the summer of 1986 there were about 100 lawsuits pending against tobacco firms
for injuries or fatalities claimed to be the result of tobacco use. Chan and Lawlor, Anti-
Smoking Pressure Snuffs Butts, USA Today, June 19, 1986, at Dl, D2.
63. 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), rev'd, 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'd on
rehearing, 350 F.2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1965), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966).
64. 295 F.2d at 296.
65. 370 F.2d at 95.
66. Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CoREU. L. REv. 678, 703
(1966).
67. Id. at 715.
68. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard News Service, Warnings may have 'saved' cigarette industry,
The Capital Times (Madison, WI), April 17, 1986, at 16, col. 1.
69. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Tenn. 1985).
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of smoking defendant's products. Roysdon alleged that the warnings
on cigarette packages and in their advertising are inadequate to fully
apprise users of the medical risks involved in smoking. 70 The court
sidestepped the factual question of efficacy, however, by first asking
whether the warnings must be ruled adequate as a matter of law.
R.J. Reynolds argued that Congress had preempted any claim
based on the adequacy of the warnings, by section 1334 of the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 71 The court agreed
that the language forbade the state from requiring a health statement
beyond that required by the Act, but that it did not expressly prohibit
tort actions based on the inadequacy of the warnings. 72 In section
1331, however, the court found the language that follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter,
to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that
effect on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be
(A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this
declared policy and
(B) not impeded by diverse, non-uniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any rela-
tionship between smoking and health.73
From this statement came the court's conclusion that congressional
purpose was 1) to inform the public, and 2) to ensure uniformity of
labeling. To expose a manufacturer to potential damages because of
its labeling, according to this court, would be inconsistent with the
second purpose, and would "permit a state to achieve indirectly,
through exposure to tort liability, what it could not achieve directly
70. Id. at 1190. A second claim, that the defendant's cigarettes are defective and
unreasonably dangerous to the health of the users, was also confronted by the court. It
determined, however, that the cigarettes are not "unreasonably dangerous" products. Id. at
1192.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) reads as follows:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required
by section 1331 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
72. 623 F. Supp. at 1190.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
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through legislation." 74 So, while tort claims were not explicitly dis-
allowed by the Act, they were implicitly preempted.
In the final analysis, this court decided that the warning does
protect the manufacturer from liability, without ever answering the
question of whether the "warnings" truly warn. According to this
court, even if the warnings fail this first purpose, to inform, they
must be made to fulfill their second purpose: uniformity. If the
warnings are actually faulty, as the plaintiff suggested, the result is
that the only benefit of the warnings is to protect the manufacturer.
This is reminiscent of the ban of cigarette advertising from television
and radio. It gives the appearance of being in the public interest
while, in reality, it advances only the interests of the regulated
manufacturers. 75 This seems a substantial convolution of congres-
sional intent.
The court does not discuss the efficacy of the warnings, but it
does state its belief that the public is adequately informed:
It finds that tobacco has been used for over 400 years and that its
characteristics also have been fully explored. Knowledge that ciga-
rette smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be con-
sidered part of the common knowledge of the community.76
That conclusion runs somewhat contrary to the findings of the
FTC, which state:
Over 30% of the public is unaware of the relationship between
smoking and heart disease. Nearly 50qo of all women do not know
that smoking during pregnancy increases the risk of stillbirth and
miscarriage. Approximately 30% of those polled do not know about
the relationship between smoking, birth control pills, and the risk
of heart attack ... approximately 20% of those polled do not
know that smoking causes cancer.77
Although the risk of smoking is generally known, there is a substan-
tial portion of the population for which the warnings are intended,
because they do not know the dangers. For that population the
success or failure of the warnings is quintessential to fulfillment of
the congressional purpose on which the Roysdon court rests its
finding.
Four months after the Roysdon decision, on April 18, 1986, a
similar case was brought before the Court of Appeals for the Third
74. 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
75. See supra, text accompanying notes 40-49.
76. 623 F. Supp. at 1192.
77. FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INvEs-
TIGATION 9 (1981).
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Circuit, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.'s Rose Cipollone had
claimed that she began smoking in 1942, and developed lung cancer
as a result. Her husband pursued the action after her death, alleging
in part that the defendant ,cigarette manufacturers failed to warn of
the hazards of cigarettes, advertised their products in a manner that
neutralized the warnings actually provided-warnings made meaning-
less by the addiction created by cigarettes-and that the defendants
ignored, failed to act upon, and conspired to deprive the public of
medical and scientific data reflecting the dangers associated with
cigarettes. 79
The lower court in this instance agreed with Roysdon, that the
Act prohibits a state from legislating additional warnings, but it
disagreed regarding the common law claims, which it found were not
preempted by the federal Act. 0 The court of appeals concurred with
the determination that there was no express preemption of common
law actions, but it found an implied preemption:
[W]e conclude that claims relating to smoking and health that result
in liability for noncompliance with warning, advertisement, and
promotion obligations other than those prescribed in the Act have
the effect of tipping the Act's balance of purposes and therefore
actually conflict with the Act ... [W]here the success of a state
law damage claim necessarily depends on the assertion that a party
bore the duty to provide a warning to consumers in addition to the
warning Congress has required on cigarette packages, such claims
are preempted as conflicting with the Act.8'
Once again, the cigarette manufacturers prevailed. Without concern
for the efficacy of the warnings, the court decided that congressional
purpose would be obstructed if it permitted common law tort claims
based upon the inadequacy of information provided to consumers.
Never mind that such a decision discourages manufacturers from
volunteering additional health information to users; a result dia-
metrically opposite from congressional desires to inform the public.
Consistency, implies this opinion, must prevail over efficacy.
Only a few days after Cipollone, on April 25, Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc.82 was handed down by the District Court of Massachu-
setts. Joseph Palmer died in 1980, from lung cancer allegedly caused
by his smoking L&M cigarettes since 1957. His wife and his mother
78. 789 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
79. Id. at 184.
80. Id. at 185.
81. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
82. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986).
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filed suit, claiming that defendants were negligent in failing to provide
adequate warnings.83
District Judge Mazzone acknowledged the decisions in both Roys-
don and Cipollone, and expressed careful consideration of those
opinions. The decision that followed, however, took quite a different
view of congressional preemption. Judge Mazzone felt that there was
neither express nor implied preemption to be read in the Act.
Regarding the Cipollone finding that permitting common law claims
would "actually conflict" with the Act, this decision remarks that
"it would not be impossible to comply with the federal law and be
subject to tort liability at the same time"' 4 and that imposition of
damages would not frustrate the Act's objectives. 85
Regarding "impossibility" of compliance, it states:
IThe Act does not exclude other warnings in addition to the federal
one, it simply requires that the federal warning be present and
prohibits states or the federal government from requiring any dif-
ferent warnings. So, if defendants choose to respond to tort liability
by adding an additional warning, stronger than that currently re-
quired, they will not be violating section 1333.86
What this suggests is that there is no preemption of common law
tort claims because they do not require additional warnings. If a
manufacturer attempts to minimize liability by additional warnings,
that is a voluntary action, and the Act does not bar the maker from
volunteering information. However, if the realities of the liability
resulting from use of this product demand an additional notice in
order for the manufacturer to stay in business, it is the product and
not the law which mandates that supplementary notice. A tort action
is not preempted, because the tobacco company may pay that claim
and continue to advertise without giving more information to its
customers. The result may well be bankruptcy, but that is the result
of product deficiencies, not of the court subverting the Act.
Finally, the Palmer decision addressed the possible frustration of
the Act's objectives. It finds that courts considering other similar
statutes have held that compliance with federal labeling requirements
does not insulate a defendant from suit. 87 Judge Mazzone summa-
rized:
My basic disagreement with the Third Circuit opinion is that it
effectively immunizes the tobacco industry when Congress did not
83. Id. at 1172.
84. Id. at 1177.
85. Id. at 1179.
86. Id. at 1177.
87. Id. at 1176.
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expressly do so. I am unwilling to join the Third Circuit in finding
immunity by implications in this case.... I am mindful of the
potential for a dramatic increase in litigation in this area and the
resultant burden on our courts and our society. The solution may
be to regulate or circumscribe exposure to liability, but the solution
must come from Congress, not the courts.88
This last decision represents another major blow to the tobacco
industry. While the Roysdon and Cipollone cases, as shown, have
some logical fallacies, it is unclear whether those cases or the Palmer
opinion will prevail.
What is clear, though, is that if there is no preemption of tort
claims, ala Palmer, the next issue to be confronted by the courts will
be whether the warnings dictated by the Act are sufficiently effective
as to preclude recovery by tort plaintiffs. On the other hand, if there
is preemption, in accordance with Roysdon and Cipollone, the only
health information that consumers are thereafter likely to receive
from manufacturers is that which Congress requires. In that instance
the burden shifts to Congress to ensure that the warnings adequately
inform consumers about the risks they are taking. In either case, the
question remains: Will the new warnings be effective? 9
New cigarette warnings, the smokeless tobacco broadcast ban and
warnings, and product liability lawsuits based upon inadequacy of
the warnings, all threaten the future of the tobacco industry. Another
threat, and one that may dwarf the foregoing to total insignificance,
was developing almost simultaneously with these attacks.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: CIGARETTE ADVERTISING MAY BE
HA~mFuL To YOUR HEALTH
Many years ago the Consumers Union, expressing concern about
the effect of cigarette advertising on teenagers and their acquisition
of the smoking habit, suggested, "The most direct approach to the
problem of cigarette advertising, of course, would be to ban it
altogether." 90 In December, 1985, the United States Surgeon General,
C. Everett Koop, declaring that cigarette smoking is the number one
88. Id. at 1180 (emphasis added).
89. See infra, text accompanying notes 208-61. Denial of a Writ of Certiorari by the
Supreme Court in Cipollone, supra note 78, might be interpreted by some as a setback for
the anti-smoking forces, since the Court could be seen as implicitly denying tort actions in
light of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. See, e.g., Mauro, High Court
Rejects Cigarette Suit; Anti-smoking Forces Say Ruling Just Minor Setback, USA Today, Jan.
13, 1987, at 6A, col. 2.
90. Consumer Union Report, supra note 8, at 188. Several state legislatures had already
considered that option at the time of this publication. Id. at 191.
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cause of premature death or disability, recommended just such an
absolute ban on advertising. At the same time an announcement was
made that the AMA would be considering support of such a ban.91
Subsequently the AMA House of Delegates approved a resolution
calling for a legislative ban on advertising and promotion of all
tobacco products, and began drafting a bill to present in Congress. 92
On June 10, 1986, Oklahoma Congressman Mike Synar introduced
the AMA draft legislation in the House of Representatives with the
title, "Health Protection Act of 1986." 93 The Synar Bill proposes to
prohibit advertising of any tobacco product, be it cigarettes, cigars,
pipe tobacco, chewing tobacco, or snuff. It would apply equally to
retailers, manufacturers, and almost anyone else who might wish to
advertise tobacco products. All forms of advertising, including news-
papers, magazines, billboards, decals, matchbooks, and all other
written or other material used for promoting the sale or consumption
of tobacco products would be precluded. It would even prohibit a
tobacco company from sponsoring athletic, artistic, or other events
under the registered brand name of a tobacco product, or from
marketing nontobacco products (such as clothing) or services that
bear the registered brand name or logo of a tobacco product. The
only promotional materials that would be permitted are point-of-
purchase price information and a sign in a retail outlet stating that
tobacco, cigarettes or cigars are sold on the premises. 94
The justifications offered to support such a drastic regulatory
91. Molotsky, A.M.A. Expected to Call for Ban on Cigarette Ads, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1985, at A2, col. 1; Sperling, Smokers Take Heart, USA Today, Dec. 10, 1985, at DI.
92. See, e.g., Kilpatrick A Cigarette Ad Smoke Screen, Nation's Business, Feb. 1986, at
6.
93. H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). It should be noted that Congressman Synar
was an appropriate choice to introduce this Bill. His State had recently lost a fight through
the courts regarding an advertising ban. Oklahoma Broadcasters Ass'n. v. Crisp, 636 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Okla. 1986), decided May 30, 1986, permanently enjoined the State of Oklahoma
from enforcing a law prohibiting alcohol advertising.
94. Id. The general rule and definitions from the Bill are as follows:
SEC. 3 TOBACCO SALES PROMOTION PROHIBITED.
(a) GENERAL RULE. All consumer sales promotion of tobacco products by
manufacturers, packers, distributors, importers, or sellers of such products in or
affecting commerce is declared unlawful.
SEC. 5 DEFINITIONS
As used in this Act:
(1) The term "tobacco product" means -
(A) cigarettes and little cigars as defined in section 3 of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1332),
(B) cigars as defined in section 5702 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
(C) pipe tobacco and loose rolling tobacco,
(D) smokeless tobacco, including all finely cut, ground, powdered, or leaf
tobacco that is intended to be placed in the oral or nasal cavity, and
(E) any other form of tobacco intended for human consumption.
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action are the unnecessary deaths of over 300,000 Americans each
year resulting from tobacco use, and the approximate $70 billion lost
in 1985 to health care and lost productivity costs resulting from
smoking related illness and premature death. The Synar Bill proposes
that Congress has taken many steps to curtail these losses, to little
avail, and that the next natural step is a total ban on advertising.95
Despite these powerful reasons, this Bill and its supporters ignited
a bonfire of debate. While the AMA, the American Cancer Society, 96
numerous legislators, 97 and even a former Chairman of the FTC,
Michael Pertschuk, 9 spearheaded this movement, the tobacco indus-
try was joined by many allies to oppose the onslaught.
Attacking the unsupported suppositions inherent in the AMA's
stated justifications, that removal of advertising would be accom-
panied by a coterminous reduction in tobacco consumption, and
reacting more specifically to the support lent by Mr. Pertschuk, the
Senior Vice President of The Tobacco Institute, William Kloepfer,
remarked:
Mr. Pertschuk's real gripe is with the product not the advertising.
Yet his product "remedy" focuses strictly on the advertising. Mr.
Pertschuk would do well to come up with the proof that a ban on
tobacco advertising and promotion would cause any American either
to stop smoking or not to start. In absence of that evidence, we
are being asked to trade in the First Amendment for a pig in a
poke. 99
(2) The term "consumer sales promotion" means -
(A) all radio and television commercials, newspaper and magazine advertise-
ments, billboards, posters, signs, decals, matchbook advertising, point-of-purchase
display material (except price information), and all other ,written or other material
used for promoting the sale or consumption of tobacco products to consumers,
(B) advertising promotion allowances,
(C) premiums and samples,
(D) sponsorships of athletic, artistic, or other events under the registered brand
name of a tobacco product,
(E) marketing of nontobacco products or services bearing the registered brand
name or logo of a tobacco product, and
(F) any other act or practice determined by the Federal Trade Commission to
constitute unlawful consumer sales promotion pursuant to its authority under section
4 of this Act.
In the case of a retail outlet, a sign stating that tobacco, cigarettes, or cigars are sold on the
premises shall not be considered a consumer sales promotion.
95. Id. at § 2.
96. A Constitutional Analysis of Proposals to Ban or Restrict Tobacco Product Adver-
tising, a legal memorandum prepared by the law firm, Covington & Burling (July 13, 1986)
(copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
97. The Synar Bill was co-sponsored by Representatives Lowry, Swift, Nelson, Hansen,
Stratton, Studds, and Atkins.
98. Pertschuk, Cigarette Ads: Lifting the Smoke Screen, Wall St. J., April 23, 1986 at
30, col. 3.
99. Kloepfer, The Bid to Snuff Out Cigarette Ads, in a Letter to the Editor, Wall St. J.,
April 30, 1986, at 33, col. 1.
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Columnist James J. Kilpatrick, revealing no pro-tobacco bias,
voiced what may be a typical view of the journalists and the media:
We have come a long way from Chrestensen, but the next year or
two could produce a major test case on this whole uncertain
issue.... For my own part, I hope that if the AMA's bill ever
becomes law, the manufacturers and the press will win, and the
AMA and its paternalistic friends will lose. Congress has no business
telling a newspaper what it may and may not print in its advertising
columns. I hold no brief, you will understand, for cigarette smoking
as such. It is a dirty, smelly and unattractive addiction, and if you
accept the statistical evidence uncritically, the habit may do all the
harm the surgeon general says it does. Even so, in a free society,
the people must be free to do foolish things, so long as their
conduct does not provably, demonstrably, significantly harm others.
In the area of human behavior, government bans don't work. Surely
we learned that much during the long dark night of Prohibition.
Who wants to learn it anew?' °
The issue quickly became one of first amendment freedoms. While
commercial speech had enjoyed protection under the Constitution
for a decade,' 0 ' advertisers had been warned that it held an inferior
position in the hierarchy of freedoms promised to other forms of
speech. 02 As a consequence of this second-class constitutional status,
the proposed ban raised an important question: whether the govern-
ment can totally prohibit advertising of a legally sold product.
Almost as if it were planned, a decision was rendered by the United
States Supreme Court just three weeks before hearings were scheduled
to commence on the Synar Bill. This decision was read by many as
an answer to that question. The timing could not have been more
propitious for advocates of the ban.
A. Puerto Rico Gambles on an Ad Ban
Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948103 legalized certain
100. Kilpatrick, A Cigarette Ad Smoke Screen, Nation's Business, Feb. 1986, at 6. The
Chrestensen reference is to Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which was interpreted
for 34 years to mean that commercial speech fell outside the umbrella of First Amendment
protection.
101. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981); Zauderer v. Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
102. "[W]e ... have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, com-
mensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). See also, Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 557.
103. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, §§ 71-84 (1972).
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forms of casino gambling, but forbade casinos from advertising or
otherwise offering their facilities to the people of Puerto Rico. The
Supreme Court was asked to assess the constitutionality of that Act
in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company.'t1
The appellant, here, was a hotel and casino which repeatedly ran
afoul of the Act in question, and finally reacted to a multitude of
fines by seeking a declaratory judgment on whether the Act violated
appellant's commercial speech rights. The Superior Court of Puerto
Rico determined that the Tourism Company, the administrative agency
which enforced the Act, had been "capricious, arbitrary, erroneous
and unreasonable" in its approach to enforcement, so it issued
narrowing constructions of both the statute and an accompanying
regulation. 0 5 Judgment was entered finding that appellant's consti-
tutional rights were violated by the Tourism Company's past actions,
but upheld the facial constitutionality of the restrictions as modified
by the court. 06 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice designate, William Rehnquist, agreed that
with the construction of the lower court the Act and the implementing
regulations do not facially violate the First Amendment guarantees
of the Constitution.'07
In coming to this decision, Justice Rehnquist's analysis claims to
follow the four-part test presented in Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Service Commission of New York:0 8
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
104. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
105. Id. at 2973.
106. Id. at 2974. The Act stated, "No gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or
otherwise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 15, § 77
(1972). Prior construction of that prohibition, through Regulation 76a-1(7), provided:
No concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the gambling
parlors to the public of Puerto Rico. The advertising of our games of chance is
hereby authorized through newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other pub-
licity media outside Puerto Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by the
Tourism Development Company of the advertisement to be submitted in draft to
the Company.
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 76a-1(7) (1972). The Superior Court's narrowing construction of
the Act added, "the only advertisement prohibited by law originally is that which is contracted
with an advertising agency, for consideration, to attract the resident to bet at the dice, card,
roulette and bingo tables." Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2973-974. At the same time the court
narrowed the Regulation, providing, in part, "Advertisements of the casinos in Puerto Rico
are prohibited in the local publicity media addressed to inviting the residents of Puerto Rico
to visit the casino." Id. By these modifications the court thereafter permitted publicity not
only outside the Commonwealth but also within, so long as it was not directed to the residents
of Puerto Rico. Id.
107. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2986.
108. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.'09
His application of this test to the facts in Posadas begins with an
acknowledgment that advertising of gambling concerns a lawful
activity, in Puerto Rico, and is not misleading. 110 The next question,
then, is whether there is a substantial governmental interest.
The ease with which the advertising ban passed this part of the
test is disturbing. As Professor Philip B. Kurland, at the University
of Chicago, states in his critical review of this case, "[The burden
is on the government not merely to assert that it has a 'substantial'
interest, but to demonstrate the nature of that interest by something
more than ipse dixit."' The Tourism Company "proves" the sub-
stantiality of its interest by the naked assertion that:
Excessive casino gambling among local residents... would produce
serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the
Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural
patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution,
the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized
crime."12
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, after quoting the above, responds, "we
have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature's
-interest in the health, safety and welfare of its citizens constitutes a
'substantial' governmental interest."" 3 The implication of the remark
seems to be that for a state (or Commonwealth) to pass muster on
this first step, it need only promise that it is doing so for the "health,
safety and welfare" of its citizens. That magic phrase is apparently
synonymous with "substantial," in the eyes of our new Chief Justice.
This is obviously not a particularly difficult element of the test. As
illustrated by Justice Rehnquist, at this first step of analysis the state
need not even show a logical relationship between the attempted
suppression of speech and the claimed interest.
The next element of the Central Hudson test is that the regulation
must "directly advance" that substantial interest. It is here that the
109. Id. at 566.
110. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2976.
111. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: 'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing
Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful, Sup. CT. REv. 1, 7 (1986).
112. 106 S. Ct. at 2977.
113. Id.
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connection between the state action and the substantial state interest
must be proved. Unfortunately, there is a sad paucity of logic extant
in this portion of the Posadas analysis. The Tourism Company made
no showing that prostitution, crime, and corruption are caused by
casino gambling. Nor was advertising shown to promote gambling
rather than just choice of casino. In addition, with no demonstration
that advertising directed at Puerto Rican citizens will somehow differ
in its outcome from advertising directed at tourists, Justice Rehnquist
acquiesces to the Tourism Company's assertion that a ban on casino
advertising directly aids the prevention of prostitution and a whole
lexicon of other evils. 1 4 Responding to the question of whether the
Kestriction directly advances the asserted interest, his complete analysis
of the issue follows:
In the instant case, the answer to this question is clearly "yes."
The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted
the advertising restrictions at issue here, that the advertising of
casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve
to increase demand for the product advertised. We think the leg-
islature's belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that appellant has
chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that
appellant shares the legislature's view. 15
This parsimonious consideration of the third element of the Central
Hudson test completely avoids asking whether those many stated ills
that the legislature seeks to quash will in any way be injured by
elimination of advertising. Certainly the inability of organized crime
to advertise its alcoholic beverages during prohibition in no way
seemed to arrest the St. Valentine's Day Massacre, nor did it effec-
tively dissuade participants from a multitude of other criminal activ-
ities at that time. It seems unlikely that the Tourism Company could
convincingly show such a connection, and without this showing there
remains a gaping hole in the causal link for "direct advancement"
of the government's asserted interest, but the Court simply overlooks
this problem in the government's case.
With the same dexterity, Justice Rehnquist sidesteps the govern-
114. Professor Kurland colorfully criticizes Justice Rehnquist's acceptance of the Tourism
Company's list of problems as a substantial interest. Reacting to that list he states:
Now there is a parade of horribles to conjure with. And it may well be that casino
gambling brings all such evils with it. But if it does, why will it be less because the
tables are dominanted by Yanquis and Anglos? Is crime, prostitution, corruption,
and the infiltration of organized crime, diminished by refusing to allow natives to
patronize the casinos?
Kurland, supra note 111 at 8-9.
115. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2977 (1986).
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ment's implicit argument that resulting crime will be any the less
with only tourists as gambling patrons than it would be with the
inclusion of Puerto Ricans. The legislature of the Commonwealth
appears to have a very low regard for its citizens. Again, the causal
link is broken for failure to make this necessary connection.
The only causal connection even mentioned by the Court is the
relationship between advertising and gambling. Justice Rehnquist,
however, sets this hurdle so low as to make it illusory. Pursuing its
rights all the way to the Supreme Court, he says, indicates that
appellant shares the legislature's view that advertising increases de-
mand. By the single act of filing suit, the appellant has proved its
opponent's case on this point. Of course, the only alternative is for
the advertiser not to pursue its rights. I venture to say that there is
no other cause of action in American law where mere institution of
the suit, alone, proves the opponent's case in that suit.
If Justice Rehnquist's remark is taken as absolute, with no need
to prove the entire causal chain, the "direct advancement" step of
Central Hudson has been made self-proving. His logic, however,
rests upon two unproved assumptions: 1) that advertising is effective
to increase consumption of a product or service, and 2) that the
advertiser's sole purpose for using advertising is to increase overall
consumption, and not merely to compete for a larger share of the
already consuming public or to reinforce loyalty to the advertiser's
particular brand (casino). No evidence is proffered to substantiate
these logical jumps. These are big, and arguably unjustified, as-
sumptions on the part of the Court; a court not composed of
advertising experts.
The fourth and final test of Central Hudson is one of overbreadth:
Are the restrictions no more extensive than necessary? Appellant
argued that the least restrictive alternative would not be to suppress
advertising, but instead to promulgate additional speech discouraging
patronage of casinos by Puerto Rican citizens. 1 6 This echos the
irecrimination by Mr. Justice Brandeis six decades ago: "If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence.""' 7
116. Id.
117. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). See Lindmark Assoc., Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1976). Accord Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 463
U.S. 60, 79 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
570-71 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
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The Court's retort, here, graciously moves aside that final barrier
from the Central Hudson test of governmental propriety. Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, responding to appellant's argument,
explains:
We reject this contention. We think it is up to the legislature to
decide whether or not such a "counterspeech" policy would be as
effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction
on advertising. The legislature could conclude, as it apparently did
here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks
of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread
advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct. H8
Again in this last test the Court permits the legislature to act on
assumptions in lieu of evidence, and it then gives deference to this
legislative guesswork. No where is there evidence recited to support
the decision that counter-advertising would be less effective than the
abolition of commercial speech.119
The net effect of the Court's analysis, while portending to apply
the scale it set forth just a few years earlier in Central Hudson, is
to boldly undermine the threshold of impermissible governmental
regulation. Under this new explication of the standard, the restrictions
on casino advertising easily pass muster. 20
118. Posadas, 106 S. Ct., at 2978. This runs effectively contrary to Justice Rehnquist's
own declaration in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (concurring
opinion):
The First Amendment, which was designed to prevent the Government from sup-
pressing information, requires us "to assume that this information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them."
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
119. The Court cites as justification for this statement, a recent case concerning a similar
restriction on alcoholic beverage advertising which arose in Mississippi:
We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place and manner restriction, such as
a disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol would be effective. The state's
concern is not that the public is unaware of the dangers -of alcohol .... The
concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption despite
known dangers.
Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259
(1984). Like the present case, that decision of legislative justification was made in an evidentiary
vacuum. And, like the present case it appears to turn on the legislature's desire to protect the
public from making a bad, although informed, decision.
120. Professor Kurland, substantially in agreement with the preceding discussion, expresses
similar outrage at the Court's analytical pretense:
[T]here is no clear indication at all of any legislative purpose except so patently
sophistical as to be incredible; there is no demonstration that the means, cutting off
speech, will effectuate any of the hypothetical ends; and there is no showing that
alternative means to these hypothetical ends were not available .... Except for a
desire by Puerto Rico to play the mystical role of Robin Hood, stealing only from
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This convolution of Central Hudson stands in stark contrast to a
policy statement which appears in that prior case:
We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress com-
mercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. In
those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from public view
the underlying governmental policy. Indeed, in recent years this
Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless
the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because it was
deceptive or related to unlawful activity. 21
No allegation of deception or unlawful activity was made in Posadas,
yet the Court now finds the nonspeech goals baldly asserted by the
Puerto Rican Legislature sufficient to justify abandonment of this
policy.
An editorial that appeared shortly after this case in Advertising
Age magazine, reflects, "Although Justice Rehnquist uses the Central
Hudson tests in arriving at this decision, he dispatches them with
ease so lacking in logic it must be an embarrassment to the other
justices who joined him in the 5-4 opinion."'-
The most disturbing portion of the Posadas opinion arose subsequent
to its Central Hudson analysis. This was an attempt to respond to
appellant's allegationlu that the restrictions were constitutionally in-
valid under the decisions in Carey v. Population Services Internationa 24
and Bigelow v. Virginia.-5 The response is particularly bothersome
because it was unnecessary in light of the fact that the analysis had
already upheld the constitutionality of the Puerto Rico legislation, and
the opinion seems to go on with the intent of making an additional
finding for the lone purpose of affecting later decisions by lower
courts. It was almost as if to lay the foundation for congressional
action in the tobacco ad ban proposal.- 6
the unworthy, a highly doubtful constitutional classification, what was the state
interest?
Kurland, supra note 111 at 7-8.
121. Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9
(1980).
122. Editorial, Prohibition Again?, ADVERTISING AGE, July 14, 1986, at 17, col. 1.
123. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
124. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). This was an action brought by contraception distributors, that
challenged a New York statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to anyone under 16
years of age and banning advertising and display of contraceptives. The Court held that a
state may not completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity even if that information is "commercial speech." Id. at 700.
125. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). This case concerned the prohibition in Virginia of advertisements
published in that State for an abortion referral service located in New York. The Court in
this instance declared that Virginia had no substantial interest in regulating what Virginians
may hear or read about activities in another state.
126. The decision specifically mentions cigarettes in this additional finding:
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Justice Rehnquist distinguishes those cases stating that the crucial
difference is that Carey dealt with advertising contraceptives and
Bigelow concerned advertising for an abortion clinic. He declares:
In Carey and Bigelow, the underlying conduct that was the subject
of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and
could not have been prohibited by the State. Here, on the other
hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited
casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether. In our
view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling neces-
sarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling
and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite. 27
If taken as more than dicta'28 this statement would not only
supplant the "lawful activity" test of Central Hudson with a "con-
stitutionally protected activity" test, it would effectively overturn
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,129 which found first amendment speech protection to extend to
advertising. The sale of virtually no product or service is protected
by the Constitution, and the state has the power to ban almost any
such activity, so it would have the lesser included power to ban
advertising for nearly anything. Essentially, any constitutional pro-
tection for the advertising of a product would be derived vicariously
from the protection afforded the underlying activity rather than from
the first amendment free speech provision.
In one quick motion Justice Rehnquist attempted to re-write the
protection for commercial speech without discarding prior decisions.
Rather than overturn Central Hudson, he subtlely re-formulated the
four parts of the test, thereby blasting a path for the state through
this former mine field and leaving the test potentially impotent. In
It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to
the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny the
legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or
activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased
demand. Legislative regulation of products or activities deemed harmful, such as
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution ....
Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
127. Id.
128. When questioned about the impact of this declaration, at the National Conference of
the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, August 4, 1986, the
Senior Vice President for Government Relations of the American Advertising Federation,
Wallace S. Snyder, responded that Rehnquist's remark was in the line of dicta, since it did
not specifically overturn prior inconsistent rulings. He further argued that the statement was
so incompatible with other cases that it would be unwise to read it literally.
129. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Justice Rehnqnist, himself, warned in his dissent that it is im-
proper to read Supreme Court decisions literally if the consequence is to overturn established
precedent when the Court's opinion manifests an intent to preserve the precedent. Id. at 836.
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his follow-through he made an equally skillful attempt to disarm
Virginia Pharmacy Board.
To illuminate this decision, it is important to realize that at the
time Virginia Pharmacy Board broke a longstanding denial of first
amendment protection for commercial speech, 130 Justice Rehnquist
was the sole dissenter. At that time he argued:
The logical consequences of the Court's decision in this case, a
decision which elevates commercial intercourse between a seller
hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the
same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace
of ideas, are far reaching indeed. Under the Court's opinion the
way will be open not only for dissemination of price information
but for active promotion of prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes,
and other products .... the use of which it has previously been
though desirable to discourage. Now, however, such promotion is
protected by the First Amendment so long as it is not misleading
or does not promote an illegal product or enterprise. In coming to
this conclusion, the Court has overruled a legislative determination
that such advertising should not be allowed.31
The predisposition of this Justice is readily observed in this statement,
as is the fact that he understands the decision to extend to all legal
activities, not just those that are constitutionally protected. His
subsequent dissent in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona32 reflects the
same stance. Even as recently as 1985, in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 33 a separate opinion by Justices O'Connor,
Burger, and Rehnquist hints at similar sentiments. In the present
decision, Justice Rehnquist has finally brought his view to the ma-
jority opinion, and he seems to have attempted a complete overhaul
of precedent in a single decision.
It is unnecessary to ask, here, whether Posadas was wrongly
decided, for I submit it is clear that falacious and insufficient testing
under the Central Hudson standard, along with its accompanying
declarations, makes it poorly decided. It is upon this weak and
termite-laden foundation that the proponents of the tobacco ad ban
rest their case. This decision was eagerly read by them as carte
blanche to prohibit advertising of a legally sold or produced product
or service, giving them an "all clear" signal from the Supreme Court
to proceed with a ban of tobacco advertising.
130. Kilpatrick, supra note 100, at 6.
131. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (emphasis added).
132. 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977).
133. 471 U.S. 626, 673 (1985).
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B. Toward A Ban On Tobacco Advertising
On July 18, 1986, a mere 17 days after Posadas, a Congressional
subcommittee led by Representative Henry Waxman, of California,
began hearings on the proposed ban.1 4 Although the Reagan Admin-
istration's Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, was an instigator and
continuing catalyst for the ban, the White House took a definitive
stand against such action. The Surgeon General was even prevented
by his superiors from appearing at the first day of the hearings, and
when he later appeared his remarks were qualified as "personal
opinions and observations."' 35 While many of the proponents, such
as Bob Keeshan (television's Captain Kangaroo), the daughter of
actor Yul Brynner, and the grandson of tobacco magnate R.J.
Reynolds, focussed their remarks on the evils of the advertised
product,13 6 it was at about the time of these hearings that the legal
ramifications of an advertising ban entered public discussion.
134. Colford, Tobacco Ad Factions Poised for Hearings, AvERTMsINO AGE, July 14, 1986,
at 12, col. 4.
135. Colford, White House Against Ban on Tobacco Ads, ADVERTSINO AGE, Aug. 4,
1986, at 12, col. 4. See Figure 3.
136. Congress Asked to Ban All Cigarette Advertising, Wis. ST. J., July 19, 1986, § 1, at
4, col. 1.
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FIGURE 3: It is interesting to note, given the stand of the Reagan administra-
tion against the tobacco advertising ban, that Mr. Reagan formerly served as
a spokesperson for one of the major cigarette brands.
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As expected, supporters of the ban quickly rallied behind Posadas
in their attempt to convince Congress and the public that a ban was
legally obtainable. In preparation for the hearings, the American
Heart Association prepared a press release outlining its position. It
stated that, in accordance with the Central Hudson and Posadas
analyses, the government has a substantial interest in banning tobacco
advertising because:
1) More than 350,000 people die each year as a result of cigarette
smoking; and
2) Cigarette smoking costs the nation $65 billion in health care
costs, accidents and lost productivity. 37
The argument then concludes that an ad ban would directly advance
that government interest:
The Court acknowledges, in both Central Hudson and Posadas,
that advertising serves to increase the demand for the product being
advertised.
The Court said in both cases that the product manufacturers/
distributors would not contest a ban on advertising unless they
believed it would increase sales. Cigarette advertising is clearly aimed
at increasing sales of individual cigarette brands and cigarettes as a
product. The Court also said that the legislature has the authority
to make the determination whether or not advertising is intended
to increase sales of a certain product.'38
This remark clearly mirrors Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Posadas,
though it over-states and over-simplifies even that unfounded deci-
sion.
A statement made before the Congressional subcommittee by Henry
Paul Monaghan, a Professor of Law at Columbia University, was
similar in its argument. With very little substantive explanation,
Professor Monaghan declares:
Posadas establishes that no first amendment right exists to advertise
a harmful product. In my opinion, the Court that decided Posadas
would uphold a ban on cigarette advertising. Thus, I find utterly
incomprehensible the assertion in the July 18th press release of the
Association of National Advertisers, Inc. that, despite Posadas, a
ban on cigarette advertising would "clearly violate" the Constitu-
tion.S9
137. A.M.A., The Myths and Realities of Banning Cigarette Advertising, Media Bull. on
Government, Vol. 1, No. 2, Aug. 1986, at 3 (on file at Pacific Law Journal).
138. Id. at 3-4.
139. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Henry Paul Monaghan, Thomas M. Macioce Professor of
Law, Columbia University).
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On the other side of the dispute, American Association of Adver-
tising Agencies (AAAA) president, Leonard S. Matthews, was quick
to criticize the Posadas decision. He concluded that Justice Rehn-
quist's suggestion that the ability to prohibit the sale of a product
necessarily carries with it the lesser authority to bar advertising of
that product "would read the First Amendment right out of the
Constitution as it pertains to advertising."'' 4 The AAAA executive
vice president, John E. O'Toole, took the position that Posadas
"arose in a unique factual situation," and could not therefore be
expected to create fallout on the First Amendment rights of adver-
tisers generally.' 41
The tobacco industry, through its law firm, Covington and Burling,
published a legal memorandum dated the first day of" the Congres-
sional hearings. The view of Posadas expounded in that document
is reflected in the statement that follows:
If one interprets the majority opinion in Posadas as deciding that
the government has virtually unlimited power to suppress truthful
speech concerning lawful products and services as long as there is
no constitutionally protected right to purchase the products them-
selves, then almost all of the Court's commercial speech decisions
since 1976 would now be open to reconsideration .... Nothing in
the Court's prior decisions ever has suggested such a radical rule. 42
The Posadas finding is distinguished, here, as being less comprehen-
sive than the proposed tobacco ad ban. The restrictions in Posadas
did not constitute a blanket ban, but merely forbade ads "addressed"
to Puerto Rican residents. During oral argument in the Supreme
Court it was admitted by legal counsel for Puerto Rico that casino
140. American Association of Advertising Agencies, American Association of Advertising
Agencies Cites Strong Disagreement With Supreme Court Decision on Constitutional Protection
for Ads, July 2, 1986 (on file at Pacific Law Journal).
141. Id.
142. Covington & Burling, A Constitutional Analysis of Proposals to Ban or Restrict
Tobacco Product Advertising, Legal Memorandum, July 18, 1986, at 23-24 (on file at Pacific
Law Journal). The overall conclusion of this opinion was that the proposed ban on tobacco
advertising would require much greater care than did the fact situation in Posadas:
We are convinced... that the Supreme Court's scrutiny of the AMA/ACS [tobacco
ad ban] proposals would be far more exacting than was its scrutiny of the casino
gambling advertising restrictions upheld in Posadas. The restrictions at issue in that
case were so porous, so lacking in actual substantive effect, that the majority
apparently considered it unnecessary to undertake a searching inquiry of the interests
purportedly being served or the alternatives that may have been available .... We
do not believe that the AMA/ACS proposals could survive the careful examination
the proposal undoubtedly would prompt .... The AMA/ACS proposals are at
once more extensive and more damaging to the First Amendment than the restrictions
considered in Posadas.
Id. at 2.
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advertising in a Spanish-language daily with ninety-nine percent local
circulation would be allowed if the advertising is addressed to tourists
and not residents. 143
New York University Law Professor Burt Neuborne, former legal
director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), presented
probably the most exhaustive and impressive explanation of the legal
consequences of a tobacco advertising ban during the Congressional
subcommittee hearings. His consideration of Posadas concluded:
[U]nless one is prepared to read Posadas as sub silentio overruling
of Virginia Pharmacy, it should be confined to those settings where
a legislature conditions the decriminalization of a generally unlawful
act upon a limitation on the ability to urge genuinely "vulnerable"
persons to engage in it. 44
Representing the ACLU at the hearings was Barry W. Lynn, its
Legislative Counsel. Mr. Lynn stated the ACLU perspective on
Posadas unequivocally:
[T]he ACLU believe that Posadas was wrongly decided even on its
narrow facts. However, Posadas is not actually a case about an
advertising ban, so much as it is a 'time, place, or manner' restric-
tion case.141
The pro-ban advocates appear to have rested their legal justifica-
tions solely upon Justice Rehnquist's explication in Posadas of the
Central Hudson test. This may be a weak foundation upon which
to structure such a radical and controversial action. Not only is
Posadas a questionable decision, its translation to the present fact
situation is arguably tenuous. In addition, denied by such narrow
analyses are the general legal premises from which the first amend-
ment was borne and through which it has matured. It is from this
point that an analysis of the ban must begin.
C. Scorching Holes in the First Amendment
The prospect of a mandated abolition of a single class of com-
munication, in toto, demands a litmus of constitutional viability
143. Id. at 5.
144. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University).
145. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Barry W. Lynn, Legislative Counsel to ACLU). It should be
noted, however, that this approach is not supported by the substance of the Court's opinion,
inasmuch as it focussed solely on the test expounded in Central Hudson.
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beyond merely matching the general concept of that proposal to the
finding of one isolated case. It must be viewed, rather, in the light
of constitutional principles that pervade our system of protection for
the communication of ideas and beliefs.
The Supreme Court has recited the broad philosophy of the first
amendment as assuring "unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple.' ' 46 In Whitney v. California,'47 Justice Brandeis explained, "Those
who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government.' 48 It is against this backdrop that a ban
on tobacco advertising should be studied.
To ban the advertising of a particular product class is to give
preferential treatment to other advertisers: to prefer one speaker over
another. The first amendment, however, forbids the government from
regulating speech in such a way as to favor some viewpoints over
others. 49 This is inherently inconsistent with the goal of engendering
an "unfettered interchange of ideas," since open intercourse is im-
possible where one of the parties is silenced. Squelching the voices
of tobacco manufacturers is an obvious example of this preferential
selection, removing a whole class of speakers from the forum of
public debate.
In much the same way, the prospect of a truly open exchange of
ideas is destined to defeat if some ideas are given preference over
others. Consequently, the government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its ideas or content. 50 The proposed ban completely
removes the messages of the tobacco industry from the public forum,
lending preference to all other messages. The only way to reconcile
146. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
147. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
148. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). A restatement of this philosophical foundation by Judge
Learned Hand appeared in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), explaining that the First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection."
149. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
150. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The renowned First Amendment
theorist, John Stuart Mill, once stated:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person,
than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind .... To
refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume
that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion
is an assumption of infallibility.
J.S. MML, ON LMERTY (1859).
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the ban with these constitutional principles is to classify tobacco ads
as non-messages.
Although it was formerly thought that advertising messages do not
contribute to the exchange of ideas and provide no information on
matters of public importance, 51 the Supreme Court has since ac-
knowledged that advertising does indeed convey at least some mod-
icum of information.15 2 While cigarette advertisements admittedly
offer fewer "facts" than many other messages, they do convey the
availability of a brand, tar and nicotine content, and a wealth of
information contained in the illustrations that are common in those
ads, 53 including a brand "image." Each of these components pro-
vides at least one message which would be removed from the "in-
terchange of ideas" guaranteed by the Constitution.
Many or most of these messages may be thought by legislators to
be of little social value, but it is not for them to predetermine which
messages hold value for the potential recipients of those messages. 54
As Mr. Lynn stated in the subcommittee hearings, "[i]f they smoke
because they like the taste, the stimulation, or even the 'image', they
certainly should have the choice to do so. They have a collateral
right to learn through advertisements that others support such deci-
151. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
152. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976). Justice Stewart's comments offer other insight into the value of advertising messages:
Although such expression may convey factual information relevant to social and
individual decision making, it is protected by the Constitution, whether or not it
contains factual representations and even if it includes inaccurate assertions of fact
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological expres-
sion because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services. The First
Amendment protects the advertisement because of the 'information of potential
interest and value' conveyed, rather than because of any direct contribution to the
interchange of ideas.
Id. at 779-80.
153. Justice White, writing for the Court in Zanderer v. Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985), directly addressed the question of whether illustrations in ads communicate ideas:
The use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves importent communicative
functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's message, and
it may also serve to imput information directly. Accordingly, commercial illustrations
are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial speech:
restrictions on the use of visual media of expression in advertising must survive
scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.
Id. at 647. See also Richards and Zakia, Pictures: An Advertiser's Expressway Through FTC
Regulations, 16 GA. L. REv. 77 (1981).
154. The Court in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), held that citizens
have a right to receive communist propaganda. This is so, said the Court, because it is up to
the individual hearer, not the State, to evaluate the worth of speech. See also, Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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sions." 155 Tobacco ads are, indeed, "messages" indistinguishable
from any other message unless one categorizes them by their idea
content. Such an approach to discriminating between messages vio-
lates the most fundamental tenets of the first amendment. But, what
about situations where the information is potentially harmful to its
recipient? Perhaps this message is justifiably singled out on the basis
of its effect, rather than its content per se.
The thrust of the argument by those proposing the advertising ban,
of course, must either be 1) that consumers, when presented with
advertising messages about tobacco products, will make a poor
decision, or 2) that the advertiser will assert some form of undue
influence on those helpless consumers. As the result of that decision,
a decision partially influenced by an advertiser's subjective beliefs
about its product or its profit motive, the consumer risks various
health hazards.
The Supreme Court previously considered this question. Its deter-
mination, in Metromedia v. City of San Diego,15 6 was that "[a] State
may not completely suppress the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion about an entirely lawful activity merely because it is fearful of
that information's effect upon ... its recipients."' 5 7 And, in Virginia
Pharmacy Board the Court stated, "It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers of
its misuse if it is fully available, that the first amendment makes for
us. '"158 Both of these statements were made while considering adver-
tising as a mode of communication within the favor of the first
amendment, and both reject the idea that -effects of the communi-
cation which result from their content are sufficient basis for regu-
lation.
Pro-ban advocates not only desire to prohibit messages based upon
content, they hope to do so without proving that advertising actually
155. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Barry W. Lynn, Legislative Counsel to ACLU). He says,
further:
We are offended, outraged, hurt, or frightened by a plethora of ideas and images.
Many societies take a plebiscite about what bothers people and eliminate or censor
that which puts allegedly dangerous or harmful ideas in people's heads. This country
quite properly doesn't do things that way. Rather than have government suppress
speech, we challenge and rebut it.
Id.
156. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
157. Id. at 505.
158. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
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causes or contributes to these abhorent effects. 1" 9 Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro,1" expressly denied that a plausible tendency of com-
mercial speech to induce its recipients into detrimental or irrational
acts was a sufficient basis for suppression. 16
During his testimony, Professor Neuborne concluded:
Starkly put, the proposed ban is a vote of "no confidence" in the
capacity of ordinary Americans to judge for themselves how to
react to tobacco advertising. Such an elitist approach, which treats
Americans as the incompetent wards of a benevolent State who
can't be trusted to evaluate speech for themselves, is wholly antith-
etical to the faith in human reason that underlies our political and
economic system. 162
A focus on the possibility of bad effects of advertising, then,
directly conflicts with the Constitutional premise of an "unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."' 163 The people have no way of
knowing what changes they want if they are kept ignorant of the
options. Of course, the social changes incurred through advertising
are primarily economic in nature. However, in a concurring opinion
in Central Hudson, Justice Blackmun declared:
I do not agree.., that the Court's four-part test is the proper one
to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a
product in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the
State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly.'"
For nearly half a century advertising has been viewed by the
judiciary as the bastard child of "legitimate" speech, holding the
speech proposing a commercial or economic transaction as somehow
less honorable than speech proposing a social or political transaction.
Indeed, in this day of economic embargos and boycotts of products
made by companies with investments in racist countries, it seems that
political and commercial speech are so inextricably entwined as to
make such a distinction artificial and nonsensical.
The simple fact is, the American citizen's voice in his or her society
159. See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text.
160. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
161. Id. at 92.
162. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University).
163. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
164. Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(J. Blackmun, concurring).
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and government is no longer relegated to a ballot box on Election
Day. We have become an economically based society in which we
vote daily, through choices of products and services. As the majority
casts its purchase-vote for computers or videotape recorders, it is
choosing, vicariously, to support research and development in the
fields of electronics and communications technology just as surely as
it would if it elected political representatives dedicated to channeling
government resources into the development of electronics and com-
munications technologies for use in defense or in space exploration.
It is likewise choosing, through those votes, the direction of this
society's development as a whole and the industries which will employ
us in the present and future. When consumers opt to purchase lesser
quantities of oil and gasoline, they vote intentionally or incidentally
to conserve the nation's energy resources and to decrease the coun-
try's dependence upon imports from other nations; they take an
active role in the determination of United States foreign policy.
Professor Neuborne remarks, "Individuals do not lose their capacity
for rational thought and their right to personal autonomy simply
because they are exercising economic as opposed to political
choices. "6s
The concept of individual autonomy is one that resides at the core
of the first amendment.166 Such autonomy or intellectual self-fulfill-
ment depends upon the availability of decisional information, be it
commercial or otherwise. 67 There is a marked difference, however,
between true autonomy and that which is merely perceived by the
individual as constituting autonomy. The most insidious breed of
government regulation is that which not only infringes upon that
autonomy, but leaves the individual with a false sense that nothing
has impinged upon that freedom. 168 An attempt by a government to
165. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University).
Professor Neuborne touches upon the value of economic speech when he says that "supporters
of the ban seriously undervalue the significance of commercial speech in our society. From a
strictly economic standpoint, the optimal allocation of goods and services in a market economy
is dependent on a free flow of information about those goods and services." Id.
166. Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette Advertise-
ments, 85 CoLaua. L. Rnv. 632, 647 (1985). See also Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1972 J. PmL. & PuB. Ass. 204.
167. Note, Television Counteradvertising: "And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor. ..
3 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 516, 517 (1972). See generally Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
429 (1971).
168. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Burt Neubore, Professor of Law, New York University).
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modify the behavior of its citizens by information control is an
offense to personal autonomy much greater than the direct prohibi-
tion of the target activity; it is nothing less than a covert form of
mind control. 16 9 The ban presently at issue is intended as the quid
pro quo of forbidding the sale of tobacco. By removing its source
from the public arena, there will be no one left arguing the pleasures
of smoking, and the sale of tobacco will diminish. This is an
unacceptable technique in a true democracy, and one which could
quickly compound its offenses.
AN AD BAN UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON
Although the fallacies of the Posadas decision, the weaknesses in
its application in securing an ad ban, and various Constitutional
principles yet stand as barriers before the pro-ban advocates, the
most substantial blockade is to be found in the four-part Central
Hudson test. Despite a certain anemia in this test since its emascu-
lation by Justice Rehnquist in Posadas, this test still holds some
promise for triumph by the defenders of the First Amendment. It
would be a significant task for the Court to gloss over this test when
confronted with the highly visible and controversial issue of adver-
tising for tobacco products, unlike the promotion of casinos in a
mere commonwealth under the influence of the United States.
A. Legality
The first part of the test asks whether the ad concerns a lawful
activity. Clearly in the case of tobacco advertising it does. However,
it also asks whether the ad is misleading. There is some argument in
this regard, but it is doubtful that a court will uphold a ban based
upon this question. It requires that the fact-finder declare all tobacco
advertising, even that not yet created, to be deceptive. This requires
a determination that it is impossible to create an ad for a tobacco
product that is not deceptive. It would be difficult to find an
advertisement such as those presently promoting Carlton cigarettes
to be deceptive, since they include no illustrations and state no more
than "If You Smoke, Please Smoke Carlton." Additionally, the
169. This is reminiscent of the scare over the use of "subliminal" messages, communicated
directly to the subconscious of its recipients without their being aware of having received a
message, which arose in the late 1950s and again in the early 1970s. Such messages, it was
feared, would influence the recipient's behavior in much the same manner as hypnotism. An
advertising ban, as proposed, is likewise intended to alter behavior without awareness, but it
is a much more realistic threat than "subliminal" seductions, since the latter have never been
shown capable of affecting behavior. See Richards and Zakia, Pictures: An Advertiser's
Expressway Through FTC Regulation, 16 GA. L. Rav. 77, 118-32 (1981).
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mandated Surgeon General's Warning effectively estops any charge
that such advertisements are deceptive because of their failure to
disclose material facts.
B. Substantial Interest
The test's second part questions whether a substantial governmental
interest exists. The answer to this question is essentially indisputable.
Indeed, the large number of lives and monetary values at issue
constitute a substantial interest.
C. Advancement of Government Interest
The third part of the test is whether the regulation will directly
advance that governmental interest. This test presents major head-
aches for proponents of the ban, unless the courts are willing to
narrowly adhere to the vacuous interpretation of this test applied in
Posadas.170 There is substantially more at stake and greater probable
resistance with tobacco advertising than with casinos, requiring greater
care for the application of this stage of the test. It is not enough to
show that there is a substantial interest in the health and welfare of
the people. The government would need to show a causal link between
advertising and the 350,000 deaths per year. It must be proved, in
essence, that tobacco advertising is the weapon, or at least one of
the weapons, used for this heinous crime. The testimony of pro-ban
advocates at the subcommittee hearings all concentrated on highlight-
ing the great evils of cigarettes. No matter how great those ills,
however, they do not justify an advertising ban if it can not be
shown that advertising contributes to this problem.
To take the position, as Justice Rehnquist did in Posadas, that
advertising must increase the number of smokers or the tobacco
companies would not challenge the regulation, is pretzel-logic. This
makes the very large assumptions, based neither in law nor fact: 1)
that speakers will never pursue their rights on principle, 2) that
advertising is effective in attracting consumers, and 3) that the only
170. Historically, this question has presented problems for those pursuing regulation of
commercial speech. In Central Hudson, the link between the advertiser's electricity rates and
its electric energy advertising was too speculative to support a prohibition. Central Hudson
Gas v. Pub. Ser. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980). In Lindmark Associates,
the city was unable to prove that the presence of "for sale" signs would cause panic selling
of real estate. Lindmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977). In
Virginia Pharmacy, there was no proof that advertising by pharmacists would result in a
lowering of professional standards. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
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intent of advertising is to increase industry sales, without regard to
brands. The first of these fallacies speaks for itself but the nature
of advertising deserves further discussion.
It is the Christmas wish of every advertiser to isolate an advertising
approach that will herd consumers like cattle to purchase a product
or service, but any such expectation circumvents reality. Though it
was once thought that the mass media could have extremely powerful
effects on the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of the receivers of a
message,171 it is now known by communication researchers that
mediated messages, such as advertising, are very limited in their
effects. 172 Thousands of products and services fail every year in spite
of their advertising.
Available evidence does not support the assertion that tobacco
advertising contributes to consumption. As early as 1962 Italy insti-
tuted a ban on tobacco advertising,'73 and was quickly followed by
several other countries. There are presently about eighteen countries
which have total bans on tobacco advertising, most of which are
communist-bloc countries. 74 These bans provide unique opportunities
to view, in laboratory-like conditions, the actual effects of such a
ban. Several studies of this phenomena have, in fact, been conducted.
In 1975 a study was presented at the Third World Conference on
Smoking and Health in New York City.175 That study statistically
analyzed per capita tobacco consumption as a function of advertising
bans in eleven different countries. This researcher determined that
none of the countries had measurably succeeded in its quest for
reduced smoking by its citizens.
A collection of data from official and trade organizations was
recently reported by J.J. Boddewyn, a Professor of Marketing at
Baruch College, which analyzes the effects of advertising bans in
171. This was known as a "hypodermic" or "bullet" effect. This theory developed at
about the time of World Wars I and II, and grew out of concern over political propaganda
which proliferated at that time. See, e.g., BECKER, McCoM]s AND MCLEOD, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF POLITICAL COONTIONS, IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS: IssUEs AND STRATEOmES FOR RESEARCH
21 (S Chaffee ed. 1975). See alo M. McCoMas & L. BECKER, USING MASS COMMUNICATION
THEORY 41 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Consumers Union Report, supra note 8, at 188.
174. Information provided by the World Health Organization, January 1986. The countries
listed at that time were Norway, Finland, Italy, Iceland, Mozambique, Algeria, Jordan, Sudan,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Yugo-
slavia, Singapore, and French Polynesia.
175. HAMILTON, Tan EFFECTS OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING BANS ON CIOARETTE CONSU?&,-
TION, IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORLD CONFERENCE ON SMOKING AND HE , Vol. II,
p. 2 (1975).
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sixteen countries.17 6 Professor Boddewyn found overall cigarette con-
sumption in Communist-bloc countries has increased by thirty percent
since 1970, despite the absence of advertising.1 77 Not only has this
absence not reduced consumption, the use of cigarettes has actually
increased. The post-ban consumption in countries with free-market
economies reflected trends that existed prior to the ban.' 78 In other
words, advertising appears to have had no impact whatsoever on
overall consumption in these countries.
Another study, produced a few years ago by a federation of
advertising industry trade associations in West Germany looked at
data from fourteen countries. That study reported, "Every country
in the world that has tried to reduce smoking by restricting tobacco
advertisements has been unsuccessful. '1 79
Despite its early entry into the ad-ban effort, per capita consump-
tion of cigarettes in Italy increased by thirty-one percent between
1965 and 1971, and by another thirty-six percent between 1971 and
1982.180 The government of Norway, frequently applauded by anti-
smokers for adopting the most severe of all advertising restrictions,
now concedes that their ban has had little or no impact on cigarette
smoking.' 8' There appears to be no study that refutes these findings.182
Studies of the impacts of the 1971 broadcast advertising ban on
tobacco products are also available. Eugene Levitt, Director of
Psychology at the Indiana University Medical School, found that
consumption of cigarettes increased during the first two years follow-
ing that ban, and then fell slightly but remained at a level above
that which existed when the ban went into effect.' 83 He also noted
that other countries instituting similar bans experienced growth of
per capita consumption ranging from seventeen to twenty-five per-
cent. Some studies have suggested that the ban in this country may
176. J.J. BODDEWYN, TOBACCO ADVERTISING BANS AND CONSUMPTION IN 16 CouNrRxEs
(International Advertising Associations 1986).
177. This study covered consumption in those countries from 1970 to 1984.
178. This studied the growth rate from the date of the ban in each country until 1984.
179. Reported in M.J. WATERSON, ADVERTIsING AND CIGARETT CONSUMPTION, at intro-
duction (The Advertising Association 1984).
180. See American Assocication of Advertising Agencies, supra note 140.
181. The Bid to Snuff Out Cigarette Ads, Letter to the Editor from William Kloepfer,
Jr., Senior Vice President of The Tobacco Institute, Wall St. J., April 30, 1986, at 33, col.
1.
182. Even the American Heart Association acknowledges this point in a recent press release.
American Heart Association, The Myths and Realities of Banning Cigarette Advertising, Media
Bull. on Government, Aug. 1986 (on file at Pacific Law Journal).
183. E. LEVTrrT, THE T.V. CIGARETT AD BAN: UNE xP EcTED FALLOUT (World Smoking and
Health 1977).
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have increased consumption because withdrawal of cigarette ads from
radio and television caused a concomitant withdrawal of anti-smoking
commercials, since the Fairness Doctrine'14 no longer provided anti-
smoking advocates with free air time. 85
A study of cigarette consumption versus volume of tobacco ad-
vertising in the United Kingdom was conducted by the Metra Con-
sulting Group. 8 6 This study looked for an association between the
amount of advertising used and consumer purchasing behavior during
the period from 1958 to 1978, using econometric analysis. The
conclusion was that advertising volume had no significant effect on
sales volume.
In 1986, Avery Abernethy and Jesse Teel, at the University of
South Carolina, published a study of tobacco consumption in the
United States over the period from 1949 to 1981.187 This research
looked at the effects of several historical incidents on the consumption
of tobacco, including the first warning on cigarette packages, the
revised warning that was adopted in 1970, the entry of broadcast
counter-advertising from 1968 to 1970, the introduction of warnings
into print advertising, and the bgoadcast ban. 8  Their conclusions
state:
Thus the banning of broadcast advertising was probably ineffective,
and perhaps even counterproductive, considering that the ad ban
was coupled with a limitation of counterads in the broadcast me-
dia .... The health warnings placed on cigarette packs, in print
ads and the counter ads on broadcast media all contributed to a
decline in tobacco consumption .... These regulatory actions ap-
parently changed consumption behavior. Informing consumers of
the health effects of harmful products seems to be a much more
184. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Hamilton, The Demand for Cigarettes: Advertising, The Health Scare, and
the Cigarette Advertising Ban, 54 Rav. EcoN. & STATISTIcs 401, 408 (Nov. 1972); Warner,
The Effects of the Anti-Smoking Campaign on Cigarette Consumption, 67 Abl. J. PuB. HEALTH
648 (1977). The FTC, however, believes that these studies suffer from several deficiencies, and
suggests that the anti-smoking commercials were relatively ineffective at reducing cigarette
consumption. FEDERAL TRADE ComnssIoN, STAFF REPORT ON CONSUMER RESPONSES TO CIGA-
RETT HEALTH INFORMATION 3-7 (1979).
186. J.J. BODDEWYN, ToBAcco ADVERTISING BANS AND CONSUMPTION IN 16 COuNTRIEs 4
(International Advertising Association 1986).
187. Abernethy and Teel, Advertising Regulation's Effect Upon Demand for Cigarettes,
15(4) J. OF ADVERTISINa 51 (1986).
188. While this is perhaps the most comprehensive study to date, it is not without its
flaws. One in particular is the fact that every regulatory action considered occurred in just a
seven year span of time. It is conceivable that even an effective action may not realize results
immediately. Consequently, an effect of the first warning on cigarette packages may not be
measurable until the time of the broadcast advertising ban, confounding interpretation of the
results of this study.
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effective means of limiting consumption than the restriction of
advertising.' 8 9
Study after study reveals the same result: tobacco advertising has
no measurable effect upon tobacco consumption, and removal of
that advertising may even hinder attempts to reduce its consumption.
Professor Reinhold Bergler, head of the Institute of Psychology at
Bonn University, claims:
All the available data point to one conclusion and one conclusion
only. Imposing a ban on cigarette advertising-irrespective of the
media forms to which it applies and irrespective of the time when
it comes into force-is not an effective way of slowing down the
rise in cigarette consumption, still less a means of producing a
decline in consumption. The available evidence tends to suggest that
any deceleration in the growth of consumption is more likely to be
due to changing public awareness in matters of health, and possibly
also to the effects of anti-smoking campaigns.'19
It seems, then, that advertising is not really a factor in the creation
of new smokers. Professor Michael Schudson, in his recent book
about the impacts of advertising on society, calls attention to the
fact that tens of thousands of women began smoking cigarettes in
the 1920s, before even a single advertisement was directed at them. 91
He states that "consumer changes are rarely wrought by advertising.
Advertising followed rather than led the spread of cigarette usage
and it was the convenience and democracy of the cigarette, coupled
with specific, new opportunities for its use, that brought the cigarette
into American life."'9
Research studies support this contention, suggesting that the influ-
ence of advertising on smoking initiation is inconsequential. 93 In
fact, many studies show that it is parents, siblings, and peer groups
that play a central role in the adoption of the smoking habit.' 94
189. Id. at 55.
190. R. BERGLER, ADVERTISING AND CIGARETTE SMOKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY (1981).
191. M. SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON
AMRIcAN SOCIETY 183 (1984).
192. Id. at 179.
193. Goldenberger and Stoll, Teenage Smoking in New Haven: Results of an In-Depth
Survey, 33(10) CoNN. MED. 629 (1969); Canadian Council on Smoking and Health, Psycho-
Social Aspects of Cigarette-Smoking, 1972-76 (1976). ,
194. See, e.g., Biglan and Lichtenstein, A Behavior-Analytic Approach to Smoking Ac-
quisition: Some Recent Findings, 14(3) J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1984); Chassin,
Presson, Sherman, Corty, & Olshavsky, Predicting the Onset of Cigarette Smoking in Ado-
lescents: A Longitudinal Study, 14(3) J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 224 (1984); Spielberger,
Jacobs, Crane, & Russell, On the Relationship Between Family Smoking Habits and the
Smoking Behavior of College Students, 32 INT'L REv. OF APPLID PSYCHOLOGY 53 (1983). Dr.
Mortimer Lipsett, Director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development,
agrees that "It]he most forceful determinants of smoking are parents, peers, and older siblings."
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If, as all of these studies indicate, advertising does not attract new
consumers to begin smoking, it may at first blush seem that all of
the expense of advertising is for naught. This is precisely what Justice
Rehnquist suggests in his Posadas deliberation. Quite to the contrary,
advertising serves a purpose other than converting new consumers to
a product: it converts pre-existing consumers from one brand of that
product to another brand.
This, in fact, is the function claimed by the advertising and tobacco
industries to be the great utility of tobacco advertising. Anne Brow-
der, Assistant to the President of the Tobacco Institute, says, "Ad-
vertising doesn't create smokers, it creates brand loyalty."' 95 John
O'Toole, AAAA Executive Vice President, testified at the subcom-
mittee hearings:
Do I mean to tell you that the tobacco industry isn't advertising in
order to expand or at least maintain its use base? No. I mean to
tell you that the tobacco industry isn't advertising at all. Individual
brands are advertising in a highly competitive effort to expand or
maintain their user bases at the expense of one another. 196
Not only those with a vested interest in tobacco advertising,
however, acknowledge this utility. In 1979 the United States Surgeon
General publicly agreed that "the major action of cigarette advertising
now seems to be to shift brand preferences, to alter market share
for a particular brand."' 97 Judge Skelly Wright, in Capital Broad-
casting, remarked, "[w]hile cigarette advertising is apparently quite
effective in inducing brand loyalty, it seems to have little impact on
whether people in fact smoke.' ' 98
The fact that a firm advertises, or is willing to fight for the right
to continue advertising does not mean that new smokers are being
created by the seduction of advertising. A single company is not as
concerned about continued growth of the industry as it is about
growth of its own volume. Whether that growth derives from industry
expansion or market share is relatively inconsequential. The Posadas
analysis would suggest that once an industry reaches its growth
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment, U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Smoking Prevention Education Act: Hearings on H.R.
1824, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1983).
195. AMA Considers Attack on Ads fQr Cigarettes, Milwaukee J., Dec. 10, 1985, at 6.
196. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of John E. O'Toole, Director of the Washington Office of the
American Association of Advertising Agencies).
197. SURGEON GENERAL, SMOKING "D HEALTH: A REPoRT oF Tim SURGEON GENERAL, 18-
23 (1979).
198. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.C.C. 1971), aff'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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potential, and is no longer bringing in new consumers, advertising
will cease because it is no longer needed. In truth, advertising at that
time becomes crucial to the survival of a company, because the
company's vitality in this mature market relies upon maintaining or
expanding the number of consumers from within that fixed pool of
users. 199 Research supports this contention. Abernethy and Teel,
reporting their study, state: "It seems that cigarette advertising
primarily affects the market share of individual brands rather than
aggregate consumption.''200
The American Heart Association counters that even if the brand-
switching purpose of advertising is conceded, the advertising must
still be used to encourage existing users to maintain their habit.20 1
As shown by the research discussed above, indications are to the
contrary, and the extremely addictive nature of cigarettes202 probably
makes "encouragement" to maintain the habit unnecessary.
There is little chance that a ban could pass muster under this third
part of the Central Hudson test. Posadas took a simplistic approach
to this question, but the mountain of evidence ready and waiting to
disprove the erroneous assumptions made in that case and the "direct
advancement" of the governmental interest, makes it unlikely that a
court will unquestioningly assume the Posadas approach.
D. Overbreadth
Even if the ban can somehow squeeze past judicial scrutiny on
that third part of the test, one hurdle remains. The final step of this
test requires that the regulatory action be no more restrictive than
necessary to realize advancement of the substantial governmental
interest.203 Where a less restrictive alternative is available, the pro-
posed action must be rejected by the courts.
Counter-advertising and more effective health warnings represent
more amenable approaches than an outright ban. The research find-
ings advanced by Abernethy and Teel214 indicate that these alternatives
are probably more effective, anyway. These options, unlike the ban,
are inoffensive to the Constitution because they prescribe more
199. A single share point in the cigarette market is worth approximately $200 million in
factory sales. Statement of John E. O'Toole, Hearing on Tobacco Advertising and Promotion,
Aug. 1, 1986, supra note 196.
200. Abernethy and Teel, supra note 187, at 51.
201. See American Heart Association, supra note 182.
202. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ST rs REPORT ON THE CIoARETTE ADVERTISING INVEs-
TIGATION 1-46 (1981).
203. Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
204. Abernethy and Teel, supra note 187, at 55.
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speech, not less.20 5 To argue, as Justice Rehnquist did in Posadas,206
that these added speech measures will be ineffective, requiring the
legislature to opt for a ban, is logically inconsistent. To argue that
a ban for advertising will directly advance the governmental interest
is to argue that advertising has powerful influences on consumers.
If the seller's message has such a profound concussion, so should
effectively composed advertising that argues its counter-point. In the
same manner the Surgeon General's warnings, being essentially
counter-advertisements within the advertisements, might be expected
to be quite effective if designed for maximum persuasive value.
During the subcommittee hearings, Gilbert Weil, General Counsel
for the Association of National Advertisers, asked Congress to table
any action on the ban until it can guage the effect of the new tougher
health warnings. 2 7 Once again, the salient question is: Will the new
warnings be effective? If the newly mandated warnings are sufficiently
efficacious, the constitutionally unpalatable ban of advertising could
be less enticing to its advocates. However, if these warnings show
little or no improvement over the former warnings, this impotency
can be expected to serve as ammunition for pro-ban advocates.
Obviously, they will say, everything short of a ban has been done,
so a less restrictive alternative will not work. Unfortunately, every-
thing possible has not been done, because many of the fundamental
principles of communications theory have been ignored in the design
of these new health warnings. If the ban is to be avoided without
forfeiting the altruistic goals of the Surgeon General and his collab-
orators, those warnings must be honed to their peak of persuasive
potential.
WHY THE NEW WARNINGS IN CGARETTE ADVERTISiNG WON'T
WORK ... MAYBE
The Commission staff discovered upon reviewing the success of
205. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
206. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2978 (1986).
207. Colford, White House Against Ban on Tobacco Ads, ADVERTiSING AGE, Aug. 14,
1986, at 8, col. 4. Professor Neuborne, in his testimony, made a similar suggestion:
The counterspeech could take at least three forms. First, the government could
mount an intensive campaign similar to the Armed Forces recruitment advertising
campaigns. Second, Congress could reaffirm the fairness doctrine while repealing
the self-defeating ban on tobacco advertising on radio and television. Finally,
Congress could fine-tune its advertising warning requirements. Before taking such
steps, however, Congress certainly should give the labelling requirements it imposed
on cigarette advertising in 1985, and on smokeless tobacco advertising earlier this
year, an opportunity to work their intended effect.
Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-167
(1986) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University).
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the prior Surgeon General's warnings in cigarette advertising and
labeling that most Americans, especially smokers, are unaware of
the risks associated with smoking. Those smokers that do know of
the hazards have insufficient information about the specifics and
how it applies to them. 208 As a direct consequence of those findings,
proposals were made by the FTC staff and the present rotational
series of four warnings2w on all cigarette advertising were eventually
adopted by Congress. Those proposals were based upon some estab-
lished principles of advertising theory, and were aimed at alleviating
certain probable deficiencies inherent in the design of the old warning.
A. Problems Addressed by the New Approach
The stated philosophy behind this measure is basically two-fold. 210
First is an effort to avert advertising "wearout," '211 where the repe-
tition of a message can reach an asymptote in the ability of consumers
to recall the message and will eventually result in "habituation" that
causes a dramatic decline in message recall.
1. Advertising Wearout
There is undoubtedly no other advertising message so frequently
published as the Surgeon General's warning, making the threat of
wearout more important to this message than to any other. The
magnitude of threat depends upon the number of repetitions of the
warning required to affect wearout. Herbert E. Krugman,212 a highly
regarded consumer researcher, argues only three exposures to an
advertisement are necessary for maximum impact and that further
repetition is redundant. For a warning which appears in every ciga-
208. The FTC staff found:
While most Americans are generally aware that smoking is hazardous, some con-
sumers, especially smokers, do not know this basic fact. However, even if it is
assumed that every consumer is aware that smoking is hazardous, the evidence
indicates that many consumers do not have enough information about the health
risks of smoking in order to know how dangerous smoking is, i.e., what is the
nature and extent of the health risk of smoking. Many consumers also do not know
whether the general health risks of smoking have any personal relevance to themselves
or whether they are among those groups of people who may be uniquely vulnerable
to those health hazards.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION 9
(1981).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a).
210. FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIassIoN, supra note 202, at 9.
211. Greenberg and Suttoni, Television Commercial Wearout, 13 J. OF ADVERTISING REs.
47 (1973).
212. Krugman, Why Three Exposures May Be Enough, 12 J. OF ADVERTISING RES. 11
(1972).
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rette ad and on every package, this supposed maximum is reached
at the very latest upon buying a third packet of cigarettes. In reality,
smokers are probably exposed to this governmental message thou-
sands of times each year.
One group of behavioral researchers conducted two studies to
examine the impact of high levels of print ad repetition on brand
name recall. 213 Their hope was to replicate wearout results in a
controlled experiment, since prior observations of this phenomenon
had been only under field conditions. They discovered that repetition
of ads three times as often as needed for 10007 learning caused
wearout when their memory was tested twenty-eight days later. 214
Seven exposures were required for maximum recall of the brand
name (contrary to Krugman's hypothesized three), but after twenty-
one exposures memory for the brand name decreased.
The second experiment conducted by these researchers revealed
that after subjects reach repetition twice that needed to learn the
content of the message they become inattentive to the ad, and over
time forget it.215 Thereafter, when the viewers spot the message they
do not pay attention to it because they perceive it as familiar even
though they have no recollection of its specific content. Smokers,
then, may be aware that the message is on the cigarette package and
in its advertising, but they quickly tire of reading it and eventually
forget what it says.
By changing the warnings in cigarette ads, even on a rotational
basis, the consumer will be presented with a new message every three
months to which he or she, in theory, must habituate anew. It is for
this reason that the FTC proposed the recent change from a single
warning to four separate warnings. This theory did not suggest what
the content of the new messages should be, it only required that they
be sufficiently dissimilar so that consumers would notice the differ-
ence and pay attention to them.
2. Personal Salience
The second problem addressed by this new approach is the "per-
sonal salience" of the message to the consumer. That is, do pregnant
213. Craig, Sternthal, and Leavitt, Advertising Wearout: An Experimental Analysis, 13 J.
oF MARaKriNa REs. 365 (1976).
214. They showed 180 Ohio State undergraduates slides of 12 print ads for 5 seconds each
with three levels of repetition. The lowest level, "1000o learning," was operationalized as "the
point where the learning curve leveled off in the immediate recall condition," found to be 7
repetitions under these conditions, rather than Krugman's 3. Subjects were also shown 200%
and 300% repetition levels, and recall was tested at 0, 1, 7, and 28 days. Id.
215. Controlling for inattention, in the second experiment, the wearout effect disappeared.
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women realize their fetus can suffer from their habit? Do chronic
cardiac sufferers understand smoking is not only adverse to their
lungs but to their heart as well? The specific nature of these new
warnings is aimed at highlighting facts that may make these risks
more important to consumers. This gives consumers help in assessing
the application of the message to their own needs, in this instance
the rudimentary psychological needs of self-preservation and parental
nurturing.216 Several studies have shown that perceived message utility
can affect consumer attention; the more useful consumers believe the
message to be to them, the greater probability they will pay attention
to it.217 The new warnings, then, take four different approaches, in
hopes that they will grab the attention of at least four different
groups of smokers.
Though Congress appears to have vitiated some of the adverse
eventualities of wearout and salience, there remain serious barriers
to communication of or persuasion by the Surgeon General's warn-
ings. This new campaign does not account for interference from an
interaction between the primary persuasive message of a given ad
(the advertiser's message) and the secondary persuasive message (the
health warning). The warning has been analyzed by the government
as if it were an advertisement standing alone, without lending serious
scrutiny to the fact that it is a single element of many advertisements,
and so must compete with the advertiser's message for reader atten-
tion. This factor might be so confounding as to make wearout and
salience virtually irrelevant to effectively communicating the health
risk information.
B. Persuasion Interference Effects in Cigarette Advertising
The two problems discussed above were emphasized by the FTC
in its argument for new warnings. These problems were founded on
four factors enumerated by the Commission: 1) the warning is
overexposed, 2) it is no longer novel, 3) its abstract nature makes it
difficult to remember, and 4) it is not likely to be perceived as
personally relevant. 218 The discussion below will consider some ad-
ditional theories that raise doubts about the sufficiency of the FTC's
216. See, e.g., Fowles, Advertising's Fifteen Basic Appeals, 39 etcera 273 (Fall 1982); A.H.
MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEiNG (1962); Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation,
50 PSYCHOLOGY Ray. 370 (1943).
217. Rosen, Post-Decision Affinity for Incompatible Information, 63 J. OF ABNORmAL AND
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 188 (1961); Maccoby, Romney, Adams, and Maccoby, Critical Periods in
Seeking and Accepting Information, in PAgis-STANoRD Sruims nI COMMUNICATIONS (1962).
218. FEDERAL TRADE COMMssION, supra note 217, at 4-10.
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considerations. This is not intended to be an exclusive list of pertinent
theories, nor is it to be an exhaustive review of each. These are only
offered to point to some additionally plausible barriers to efficacy
of the warnings, apparently overlooked by the Commission. The
FTC's own data reveals that less than 3% of adults exposed to
cigarette ads ever read the message,2 9 so the obstacles are enormous,
and all possible factors must be evaluated.
The Statement of Basis for the original FTC rule on cigarette
labeling2 offered some observations on ad content. These remarks
assert two legal bases for a finding of deception, implicit falsity and
explicit falsity. They state:
One examination of cigarette advertising indicates that two elements
predominate: one, *portrayal of the desirability of smoking; and
two, assurance about the safety of cigarettes or relative safety of
the advertised brand ... current advertising predominantly associ-
ates smoking with romance, fun, and recreational activities .... 
While the explicit falsity that cigarettes are safe is no longer found
in advertising appeals, the implications of safety through the asso-
ciation with healthy activities are not only common but seem to have
become the norm. Winston cigarettes are sold through pictures of
jet and helicopter pilots on apparent rescue missions (see Figure 4),
and Camel is represented by a rugged-looking man shooting the
rapids or camping in the wilderness. Other well-known campaigns
include the "Marlboro Man" ads showing a rugged cowboy in action,
and the Virginia Slims "suffragette" theme which pairs cigarettes
with signifiers of independence and equality. Each ad portrays activ-
ities and themes not inherently related to the factual, observable,
qualities of tobacco shavings stuffed into a tube of tissue paper.
219. Id. at 20.
220. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282, July 27,
1965.
221. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8341 (1964).
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These nonfactual types of appeals have been called variously
"social-psychological," 222 "evaluative,, 223 ''feeling,' '224 ''arbi-
trary, '" 2  and "social reality" 6 appeals, and have come to be
commonplace in contemporary advertising. (The term "evaluative"
will be used here.) Morris B. Holbrook, 227 a business professor at
Columbia University, described factual content as "logical, objec-
tively verifiable descriptions of tangible product features," and eval-
uative as "emotional, subjective, impressions of intangible aspects
of the product." From a sample of 600 contemporary print ads, one
researcher z28 found that 43.3%70 were evaluative.
A primary function of evaluative advertising is to differentiate
competing products having no unique qualities important to a con-
sumer's purchasing decision.229 Since the brands have no significant
factual differences, the marketers create "image" differences that
imply social benefits of status or peer group acceptance, etc., to
produce unique perceptions of their products. Cigarettes fit neatly
into this marketing strategy, and the consequence is a prevalence of
evaluative ads for cigarettes. Use of such appeals in cigarette ads to
imply product safety was alleged in a recent law suit.
In 1983, Robert Raney, of Indianapolis, filed a $12 million suit
against R. J. Reynolds, claiming that he had been deceived through
its advertising. 20 His complaint stated that the company "through
its extensive advertising program, has created the impression ... that
the smoking of cigarettes is a desirable act and that it could be done
safely." 2 1 Raney claimed he suffered physical and psychological
damage by inhaling smoke, lost 'job productivity, social contacts,
and sleep because of an addiction to smoking, and that his life
expectancy- had been drastically shortened. His attorney argued,
222. Shimp, Social Psychological (Mis)Representations in Television Advertising, 13 J. oF
CONSUMMR AFF. 28 (1979).
223. Shimp and Preston, Deceptive and Nondeceptive Consequences of Evaluative Adver-
tising, 45 J. OF MARKETING 22 (1981); Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: Toward the
Informational Determinants of Attitude, 15 J. OF MARYET G Rs. 545 (1978).
224. Golden and Johnson, The Impact of Sensory Preference and Thinking Versus Feeling
Appeals in Advertising Effectiveness, 10 Anv.ircsi N CONSUMER REs. 203 (1983).
225. Preston, Theories of Behavior and the Concept of Rationality in Advertising, 17 J.
OF COMMUNICATION 211, 213 (1967).
226. Mizerski and Settle, The Influence of Social Character on Preference for Social Versus
Objective Information in Advertising, 16 J. oF MARKETING REs. 552 (1979).
227. Holbrook, Beyond Attitude Structure: Toward the Informational Determinants of
Attitude, 15 J. OF MARKETING REs. 545, 547 (1978).
228. Marquez, Advertising Content: Persuasion, Information, or Intimidation?, 54 JOUR-
NALiSM Q. 482 (1977).
229. See Shrimp and Preston, supra note 223.
230. Led astray by cigarette ads, says smoker, Indianapolis Star, June 29, 1983, at 38.
231. Id.
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"[t]he warnings on the cigarette packs are contradicted by the massive
advertising campaigns that portray smoking as a highly desirable
thing to do."'232
This is an accusation that the warnings are subjugated by the
products' own persuasive appeals. There appears to be no research
on the relative success of the warning vis a vis the competing primary
appeal in the ads, but some predictions can be made from existing
theory. This discussion will begin by reviewing the learning theory
behind the advertisers' persuasive message, so the potential problems
can be seen in light of the intentions that justify the large expenditures
made in promoting cigarettes.
1. Associative Learning Through Observation
The spectator-buyer is meant to envy herself as she will become if
she buys the product ... the publicity image steals her love of
herself as she is, and offers it back to her for the price of the
product.233
Evaluative appeals depend upon associating desirable objects or
situations with the promoted product. Forming this association in
the consumer's mind relies upon "conditioning. ' ' 234 One form, "clas-
sical conditioning," 235 occurs when an initially neutral stimulus (the
conditioned stimulus, in this case the product) is associated with
another stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus, which in advertising
would be the desired object or experience) connected by prior expri-
ence to some response (the unconditioned response, such as enjoy-
ment of the activity portrayed). The conditioned stimulus is vicariously
connected to the unconditioned response. So, for example, a cigarette
brand is depicted in each of its advertisements in use by skiers on
snow-covered mountains. The consumers, hopefully, have good feel-
ings about past experiences with snowy mountain scenes or skiing,
and those consumers will theoretically "connect" those feelings to
this brand of cigarettes.
The Surgeon General's warning is inherently inconsistent with the
unconditioned stimuli generally used in cigarette advertising, i.e.,
232. Keating, Tobacco ads upset unhappy smoker, Indianapolis Star, July 28, 1983, at 17.
233. BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 134 (1980).
234. For a more complete discussion of this technique, see Richards and Zakia, Pictures:
An Advertiser's Expressway Through FTC Regulation, 16 GA. L. REv. 77, 98 (1981).
235. R. PEr'Y AND J. CAcioPpo, ATrnUDs AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY
APPROACHES (1983). See also Allen and Madden, A Closer Look at Classical Conditioning, 12
J. OF CONSUMER REs. 301 (1985).
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sports and other healthful activities. 2 6 It is obviously improbable for
a consumer to form an attitude or belief in harmony with both the
message of the advertiser that smoking is healthy and the message
of the government that it is not. If it is possible to condition attitudes
with advertising, and the advertiser's persuasive message can over-
power the verbal warning, then the likely result will be a positive
feeling toward the product in spite of the health dangers of smok-
ing.237
The question directly relating to cigarette advertising is whether
pictures can direct attitudes. Mitchell and Olson231 designed four
different "uncompleted" ads, each promoting its own brand of facial
tissue. One consisted solely of an explicit verbal claim of softness,
while the other three offered only the brand name paired with a
picture (one a kitten, one a sunset, and one of an abstract painting).
Subjects were shown the ads, then tested for brand preferences and
perceptions of product attributes. In spite of the explicit verbal claim
in one ad, the one depicting the kitten created the strongest belief
of softness.
Not only does this illustrate conditioning with visual messages, the
impact of the visual mode proved greater than the verbal. It is no
great logical jump to guess that a verbal warning may be impotent
in the shadow of a strong visual assertion. This may help to explain
why only three percent of consumers even look at the warning, since
cigarette advertisements are predominantly pictorial.
Even if they do see the warning, it may not be remembered because
of the overpowering visual image. Indeed, Paivio239 discovered that
236. FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADvERTriSNO INVES-
TIGATION 2-2 (1981); Richards and Zakia, supra note 234, at 104.
237. Though conditioning was originally interpreted as a physiological response, research
shows that attitudes, too, can be conditioned. An example of a conditioned affective response
to advertising, where music served as the unconditioned stimulus, was found by Gorn. Gorn,
The Effects of Music in Advertising on Choice Behavior: A Classical Conditioning Approach,
46 J. OF MARKETIG 94 (1982). He pretested 10 music pieces on a preference scale, to find a
"liked" and a "disliked" song. Next he pretested several colors of writing pens, and found
two colors that rendered "neutral" responses from 80% of subjects. Finally, he tested pairings
of all four combinations of the two musical pieces and the two pens. Gorn's results revealed
that 79% of subjects chose the color of pen associated with the "liked" music. This strongly
suggests successful attitude conditioning. Other researchers have similarly affected attitudes by
conditioning. Razran, Conditional Response Changes in Rating and Appraising Sociopolitical
Slogans, 37 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuuL. 481 (1940); Staats and Staats, Meaning Established by
Classical Conditioning, 54 J. OF EXPERtMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 74 (1957).
238. Mitchell and Olson, Are Product Attribute Beliefs the Only Mediator of Advertising
Effects on Brand Attitude? 18 J. OF MARKETING R s. 318 (1981).
239. PAIVIo, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSING 201 (1971).
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subjects can remember visual stimuli even better than verbal. 2 These,
however, are not the sole considerations used here to suggest possible
weaknesses of these new warnings.
2. Dissonance and Selective Exposure
Consumers encounter a conflict when they perceive the inconsistent
messages of the advertiser and the government. On one hand con-
sumers are visually told that healthy, active people smoke, while they
are verbally warned that smoking is unhealthy. This is a classic case
for application of the "cognitive dissonance theory."
When people receive messages in conflict with their own beliefs, a
psychological tension is created. To reduce tension, according to
Leon Festinger, 241 they have three alternatives. First, they can ac-
quiesce to the new message, changing their attitude or behavior in
accord with the new information. This eliminates tension by vitiating
the preconception that created it. Second, they can seek information
supporting their position, which consequently refutes the inconsistent
information. The final alternative is changing the importance which
they attach to both the prior attitude and the new information. This
method diminishes the tension because it is of lesser consequence to
them.
When analyzing cigarette ads in terms of the first reaction, the
warning may have the desired impact. If smokers are confronted
with the dangers, a simple solution to the conflict is to quit smoking.
But, this method is not so easily adopted. The simple fact is that
cigarettes are extremely addictive, and quitting is not always just a
matter of changing one's mind . 2
The same problem adheres under the third alternative. It is no
simple matter for smokers to discount the importance of their own
lives to relieve a little tension. The more likely route to consonance
is the second option.
This choice suggests that people will try to find information
supporting their own position, and upon finding confirmation will
dismiss the dissonant message as wrong. Cigarette ads seem to fit
240. See also Percy and Rossiter, Mediating Effects of Visual and Verbal Elements in Print
Advertising Upon Belief, Attitude, and Intention Responses, in PERCY AND WOODSIDE, AD-
VERTISING AND CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 171 (1983). Childers and Houston, Conditions for a
Picture-Superiority Effect on Consumer Memory, 11 J. OF CONStrER RS. 643 (Sept. 1984).
241. FESTINOER, A THEORY OF CoNmTIVE DISSONANCE 264 (1957).
242. FEDERAL TRADE COMUSSION, supra note 202, at 1-46; Flaxman, Quitting Smoking
Now or Later: Gradual, Abrupt, Immediate, and Delayed Quitting, 9 BEHAv. THERAPY 260
(1978).
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this method of coping, since the ads typically supply both a dissonant
verbal message and a supporting pictorial one. People who do not
feel that smoking is a serious threat to their lives can find confir-
mation for that opinion in the positive image portrayed in the biggest
portion of the ad.
For a new or prospective smoker, where no addiction is yet formed,
it is possible to cope either by rejecting the smoking habit, or by
minimizing the significance of the conflicting messages, possibly by
rationalizing that since they smoke only occasionally the warning
does not apply to them. However, when habitual smokers confront
this dilemma, seeking dissonance-reducing information is probably
the only viable alternative, so they "selectively attend"24 3 to the
supportive information and simply ignore the health warning as an
inaccuracy or overstatement.
Erlich, Guttmann, Schonbach, and Mills 2" explored preferences
for, or selection of, supportive information by showing recent pur-
chasers of automobiles eight envelopes supposedly containing ads for
different brands of cars, and asking them to choose which they would
prefer to read. Over eighty percent of the subjects chose an envelope
containing ads for the cars they had just purchased, while chance
would predict that only twenty-five percent would so choose. There
seems a tendency for people to pick the messages that reaffirm their
own positions. Childs notes that, "Innumerable studies show that
readers tend to read what they agree with, approve, or like." 245
Actually, studies continue to reveal both avoidance of and pref-
erence for opposing information, depending upon numerous fac-
tors. 246 M.T. Feather, before the first warnings were required,
discovered that when smokers and nonsmokers were asked to rank
their interest in several types of magazine articles, one of which was
either "Smoking Leads to Lung Cancer" or "Smoking Does Not
Lead to Lung Cancer," smokers displayed greater interest in both
articles than did nonsmokers. This researcher also found, however,
that smokers "are more critical of evidence that cigarette smoking
leads to lung cancer than are nonsmokers. They are more likely to
243. Jecker, Selective Exposure to New Information, in FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION,
AND DISSONANCE 65 (1964).
244. Erlich, Guttmann, Schonbach, and Mills, Post-Decision Exposure to Relevant Infor-
mation, 54 J. oF ABNoRmAl. AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 98 (1957).
245. H.L. CHILDS, Puauc OPnIoN: NATURE, FomAToN, AND ROLE 181 (1965).
246. See, e.g., Sweeney and Gruber, Selective Exposure: Voter Information Preferences
and the Watergate Affair, 46 J. OF PERsoNALrrY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1208 (June 1984).
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rate this evidence as unconvincing." 247 While this predicts that they
may not avoid the warning in cigarette ads, they will probably
discount or counterargue its substance because of the magnitude of
their convictions. The above description of selective exposure and
attention ignores several factors, one of which is magnitude of
discrepancy between the prior conviction and the new information.
Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall offer an assimilation-contrast theory,
that when new information received is not grossly discrepant from
prior held beliefs, a person may accommodate this information by
perceiving it as being closer to their own position than it really is,
and subsequently shift their position in the direction of the new
information.2 However, when the message is highly divergent from
their position, a "boomerang effect" can result; receivers move their
own position even farther from the advocated position. For cigarette
ads this could again mean that borderline consumers would be
persuaded, but confirmed smokers will more adamantly believe their
health will not suffer. This "boomerang" of cigarette warnings was
found in one experiment.
One of the few published studies to experimentally test the efficacy
of cigarette health warnings looked at the warning used in Great
Britain.249 The warning used there is, "Warning by HM Government.
Smoking can damage your health. High/Low/Middle Tar." These
researchers submitted forty-eight homemakers to alternating alcohol
and cigarette ads in a slide presentation (forty-nine ads, total). Upon
viewing each slide the subjects filled in four scales regarding ad
quality: its familiarity, desire for a drink, and desire to smoke a
cigarette. While the results are far from conclusive, the presence of
a warning increased desire to smoke, suggesting a boomerang effect. 20
If the coping mechanisms described by Festinger are at all accurate,
theories about cognitive dissonance and selective exposure to sup-
portive information may be helpful in critically weighing the validity
of the present regulatory approach to warning the public about the
health risks of smoking. This approach points to some value of the
warnings for marginal smokers, but suggests it may "boomerang"
with the population at the greatest risk: the heavy and addicted
247. Feather, Cognitive Dissonance, Sensitivity, and Evaluation, 66 J. OF ABNORmAL AND
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 157, 161 (1963).
248. SHaaRn, SIHERIF, AND NEBERGALL, ATTITUDE AND ATTrruDE CHANGE (1965).
249. Hyland and Birrell, Government Health Warnings and the 'Boomerang' Effect, 44
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 643 (1979).
250. Id. (This effect, however was not constant over all of the ads).
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smoker. Admittedly, there is evidence that in certain situations sub-
jects show a preference for information that is contrary to their own
position. 2 1 This only reinforces the need for further study by the
FTC directed at the specific effects of the warning in its normal
context, competing with commonly used evaluative visual claims. One
additional theory which will be considered here is consumer product
"involvement".
3. Involvement
For nearly thirty years the predominant theories of advertising
communications have been "hierarchical," stating basically that
knowledge leads to attitude which leads to behavior. 2 2 In 1965,
however, Herbert E. Krugman presented a new theory of "low
involvement." This theory posited that, when viewing advertising
requiring only minimal cognitive activity, behavior may precede at-
titude.253
Where subjects are highly involved with a product, such as where
the product represents a major expenditure, they are likely to spend
time digesting information about that product, comparing its features
to competing brands. This is a "high involvement" condition, where
a hierarchical model would apply. Many products, however, like
toothpaste or cigarettes, require a lesser involvement, because a
"wrong" purchase decision is of minor consequence. Next time he
or she can try a different brand. This small commitment suggests
low involvement. High involvement, then, requires more judgmental
mental activity and greater time for assessment than does the low
involvement. Smith and Swinyard review many of the relevant studies
on low involvement since Krugman's original proposal, and note that
while new conditions and complexities have been identified, it remains
a theory substantially intact.254
Krugman, expounding on his theory, believes that "quick and/or
faint perceptions of product advertising, even unremembered, do
their job in most cases .... I suggest that ads are meant to be
251. Freedman, Preference for Dissonant Information, 2 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 287 (1965).
252. Lavidge and Steiner, A Model for Predictive Measurements of Advertising Effective-
ness, 25 J. OF MARKETING 59 (1961).
253. Krugman, The Impact of Television Advertising: Learning Without Involvement, 29
PUB. OPINION Q. 349 (1965).
254. Smith and Swinyard, Information Response Models: An Integrated Approach, 46 J.
OF MARKETING 81 (1982).
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looked at, to communicate as quick as a wink .... The real ad is
what's to look at." 255 This argument makes sense, since print ad
viewing time averages only about four seconds.2 16
In other words, much of advertising, because of these minute
exposure times, depends upon low involvement processing. According
to Krugman, they depend more upon repetition than time spent
scrutinizing the ad. This means, he concludes, that the pictures in
the ads are crucial to their success, so that the sight of the product
on the shelf of a store will "trigger" recognition of that product-
association formed through the conditioning process. This is because
consumers will not take the time to read verbage in an ad and then
rehearse the information sufficiently to form an attitude. Krugman
states, "The future of low-invovement theory is in this nonverbal
area.' '257
This line of thought hints that the diminutive print of the Surgeon
General's warning may require a higher level of involvement and
cognitive activity than is normally dedicated to a highly visual ad
for an extremely low involvement type of product. This is especially
salient, since the warning occupies only 2-3% of a typical 8 1/2 x
11 inch magazine advertisement 5 8  (See Figure 5) Only enough of
the ad is "seen" to be able to later recognize the association formed
about the product through repeated exposure, not to recall the
advertisement. 259
255. Krugman, Memory Without Recall, Exposure Without Perception, 17 J. OF A.DVER-
TIsING RES. 7, 11 (1977).
256. Batra and Ray, Advertising Situations: The Implications of Differential Involvement
and Accompanying Affect Responses, in HARus, INFORMATION PROCESSING RESEARCH IN
ADvERTISING (1983).
257. Krugman, supra note 253 at 9.
258. Lorillard, 80 F.T.C. 455, 461 (1972), aff'd 527 F.2d 1115 (1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 911 (1976).
259. "Recognition" of something entails viewing the item and remembering having been
exposed to it in the past, like recognizing a face without remembering where you have seen
it. "Recall" involves the ability to call an item out of memory without the help of first seeing
it, just as you might be able to tell someone the name of your high school English teacher
without looking back in your yearbook.
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Krugman identifies recognition as picture memory, and recall as
verbal comprehension, so it should be a simple matter for the FTC
to sort out some of this relationship between ad and warning by
testing both recognition and recall of the ads and their warnings. 260
Such a study would increase understanding of the impact of the
health warnings, and give further insight into the workings of ad-
vertising communications in general.
This review highlighted only a few of the theories and findings
apparently unknown to the FTC. 26' Thought should likewise be given
to work in other areas of communication theory. The selection
included here was chosen, not because they "prove" inadequacy of
the new warning scheme, but because they raise serious doubts that
should be confronted if regulatory efforts are to be maximized. Will
the new warnings be effective? There is cause for doubt. However,
with sufficient research more effective alternatives would probably
be discovered.
OUT OF THE ASHES OF A BAN
If this ban were to be approved by the courts, ignoring the strong
arguments against it, the aftershocks very probably would be sub-
stantial. First would come the economic fallout which would drop
on the print media houses. 26 2 Removal of tobacco advertising from
magazines, alone, would mean a loss of about $340 million per year
in revenues. This loss translates to a minimum loss of 10,000 jobs. 263
Tobacco ads account for about eight percent of magazine revenues. 264
This is a nontrivial blow to our otherwise free press.
A second consequence is the elimination of tobacco company
sponsorship of athletic, artistic, and other socially beneficial events.
Without the public relations benefits adhering to such sponsorship,
260. Krugman, supra note 253, at 11.
261. FEDERAL TRADE CommISSioN, supra note 202, at 9.
262. William F. Gorog, President of the Magazine Publishers Association, testified to the
Congressional subcommittee:
[T]he right to advertise lawful products or activities in a truthful manner, in our
view, is an important element of constitutional liberties. It is so because without
revenues from advertising, there really is no "free press." It's the life blood of
successful publishing, and it has been since the industry started. It is as necessary
to a free press as the freedom of a pamphleteer to peddle his views or a Member
to address the House without fear of prosecution.
Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-167
(1986) (statement of William F. Gorog).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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support will surely dwindle. Not only will the speech of these adver-
tisers no longer be "free," the artistic and athletic expression of
others will be injured.265
A third probability is the extension of this new regulatory technique
to other questionable products. 26 Alcohol advertising is the first
likely candidate for prohibition. The most serious question, however,
is whether or not it would stop there. For example, little would
remain to prevent the government from intervening to protect children
from the advertising of sweets or toys. After that we might expect
prohibitions on the advertising of offensive products like contracep-
tives. The government would certainly promise to administer this tool
sparingly, but when the first amendment is removed from consider-
ation, there- is no longer a system of checks and balances to assure
that this promise is kept.
Each of these three impacts trammels rights of many outside the
tobacco industry. These ramifications cannot be ignored when testing
this regulatory action under the first amendment.
The fourth and fifth probable impacts, ones which should concern
the supporters of the ban, would represent backfires of this effort
to improve the health of Americans. Research into the effects of
tobacco advertising bans in other countries have discovered that
advertising has been instrumental in the conversion of smokers to
filtered and low-tar cigarettes. 267 Removal of this advertising could
cause a slow-down in switching consumers to less hazardous tobacco
products.
Along with abolition of advertising will almost certainly go the
incentive of tobacco companies to develop newer and healthier
smokes. 26 Research and development for products is driven by the
265. Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of Barry W. Lynn, Legislative Counsel to A.C.L.U.). Mr. Lynn
claims, "[W]hen sponsorship of events is effectively banned ... the collateral First Amendment
implications are significant." Id.
266. Commissioner Loevinger, of the Federal Communications Commission, stated several
years ago that "Itihe Commission will be hard pressed to find a rational basis for holding
that cigarettes differ from all other hazards to life and health." WCBS-TV, 11 R.R.2d 1901,
1943 (1967).
267. M. J. WvATERSoN, ADvERTsmo AND C-oA-rrE CONSiMPrON 7 (The Advertising
Association 1984); Tobacco and Advertising Promotion: Hearings on H.R. 4972 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, and the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 99-167 (1986) (statement of William F. Gorog); American Newspaper Publishers
Association, Tobacco Advertising Ban and the First Amendment, Legal Memorandum (July
1986) (copies on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
268. Association of National Advertisers, A.N.A. Calls Tobacco Ad Ban Proposal Uncon-
stitutional, Calls for Consideration of "Lesser Restrictions" Under Central Hudson and
Posadas, News Release, Aug. 1, 1986 (on file Pacific Law Journal); J. J. BODDENVYN, TonACCO
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monetary impetus of attracting consumers away from competing
products that do not have these new features. If these newly created
benefits cannot be communicated, consumers will not change brands.
These last two effects are not only disincentives to the pursuit of
a ban, they also represent factors for consideration by a court when
assessing the constitutional validity of an advertising ban. Under the
third part of the Central Hudson test, requiring that the regulatory
action directly advance a substantial governmental interest, any ad-
vancement of the interest in question is effectively offset by any
exascerbation of that interest caused by the action.269
Finally, the inability of tobacco companies to use advertising will
construct a nearly insurmountable barrier of entry into this market
by new competitors. In that way it will actually aid existing tobacco
companies in warding off competition. 270
According to newly appointed FTC Chairman, Daniel Oliver, a
ban is "more likely to harm consumers than to help them." 271
CONCLUSION
The present challenges to tobacco advertising are substantial, but
the most serious of these is one which could infect the speech rights
of all advertisers. Although Cbngress did not enact the Synar Bill
into law during 1986, Congressman Synar re-introduced the Bill on
February 18, 1987.272 An infestation of this magnitude is one which
ADVERTISING BANS aND CONSUMPTION IN 16 CourNrsEs (International Advertising Association
1986); Waterson, supra note 267, at 7.
269. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2977 (1986).
270. John C. Maxwell, Jr., an industry analyst for Furman, Selz, Dietz, Mager & Burney
in New York, made the following prediction about the effects of an ad ban:
It would be the best thing that ever happened to Philip Morris and Reynolds,
because it would freeze the trend, and Philip Morris and Reynolds are growing to
the detriment of practically everyone else .... It would be very hard to introduce
a new cigarette.
Gloede, Lotsa Smoke, No Fire, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 2. Together, R.J.
Reynolds and Philip Morris at year-end of 1985 held about 67.5 percent of the entire U.S.
domestic cigarette market. Id.
271. Colford, White House Against Ban on Tobacco Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 14,
1986, at 1, col. 4.
272. The Bill was introduced in the 100th Congress as H.R. 1272. See 45 CONGRESSIONAL
QuARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT 334 (1987). See also Colford, Tobacco Ad Foes Press Fight,
ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 23, 1987, at 12, col. 1; Meddis, Push to Ban Tobacco Ads Moves to
Congress, USA Today, Feb. 17, 1987, at 7A, col. 1. Although no similar legislation was
introduced in the Senate, Senator Ernest Hollings soon thereafter announced his intention that
the Senate Commerce Committee would claim jurisdiction over the legislation. See Hollings
Aims at Ad Bans, ADVERTISING AGE, March 16, 1987, at 8, col. 1. In addition, the American
Bar Association House of Delegates, during a mid-February meeting, voted on a resolution to
support the ban of tobacco advertising, but the resolution was defeated after a heated debate.
See ABA Rejects Tobacco Ad Ban, 73 ABA J. 32 (Apr. 1987).
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endangers the rights of every citizen. The logic supporting this attack
is faulty, but such invalid logic has already condemned the right of
gambling casino owners in Puerto Rico.
It is certainly possible to criticize insufficient regulation of adver-
tising practices273 and illogical attempts by the advertising industry to
disarm the regulators.274 There is a universe of difference, however,
between assuring that commercial information flows cleanly, and
squeezing off the flow altogether. Advertising is important to the
perpetuation of this society, and it serves the functions of informing
consumers about features and availability of products and moving
commerce to keep the people employed. It is a form of speech.
Sellers have a right to speak, even if that speech is commercial in
orientation, and consumers have the concomitant right to hear what
these sellers have to say. Prohibition of speech is not a proper means
of controlling purchase behavior in a free society, and this is an
especially egregious consideration when all available evidence indi-
cates that advertising bears no rational relationship to the behavior
in which the government asserts an interest.
It is not the responsibility of regulators to deter smoking, but to
ensure that a decision to smoke is an informed assumption of risks. 27 5
Without assessing the impact of the Surgeon General's warnings
through empirical research there can be no such assurance of an
informed freedom of choice. Both theory and research suggest that
the new efforts to increase effectiveness of the warning, while a step
in the right direction, may not be accounting for some of the greatest
threats to communication of these health hazards.
In all fairness, the Commission did conduct extensive research,
including surveys and the advice of consultants. Through this inves-
tigation it learned, e.g., that thirty percent of the public was unaware
of a relationship between smoking and heart disease, and twenty
percent did not even know that smoking causes cancer. Its studies,
however, focused primarily on attitudes, knowledge, and beliefs about
smoking, and the efficacy of a more informative warning compared
to the older warning. Little attention was dedicated to overcoming
the competition, which it acknowledged, between the advertiser's
message and the warning.
In 1970, prior to the ban of cigarette advertising on the broadcast
273. See generally, Richards and Zakia, supra note 234.
274. See generally, Preston and Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension as a Challenge to
FTC Prosecutions of Deceptive Advertising, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 605 (1986).
275. Cipollone and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907.
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media in 1971,276 the cigarette industry spent a total of about $50
million for advertising, and by 1979 it had risen to $260 million.2 77
This is a powerful and pervasive source of persuasive communica-
tions. If not effectively countered, the void of appropriate health
information may only grow larger, possibly reaching a point where
the accumulated effect of these promotions are beyond the ability of
the government to correct.
The FTC, in studying the effect of the health warning used from
1970 to 1985, found that this design was substantially ineffective.2 7
A repeat performance might well be avoided if due consideration is
given to communications theories and empirical research.
In 1972, at the time the FTC required inclusion of the warning
into print advertising, Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones submitted
a written dissent:
The Commission had no proper empirical or clinical basis on which
to support the instant order provisions and hence had no reason to
believe that the required disclosures would in fact be clear and
conspicuous to the casual readers of the magazines in which these
advertisements are intended to appear.279
The present analysis spotlights some of the potential problems not
addressed by the new warning scheme. While these problems are
unconfirmed by research, their mere possibility demands further
study. Through such research a more effective design might be
discovered. It might be found that introduction of an iconic warning,
like a skull and crossbones, would enable the reader to process both
messages in the same visual modality, thereby eliminating the dis-
crepant efficacy of visual and verbal messages. Another option could
be to replace the present warnings with counter-advertisements of
like size and design to be published for every cigarette ad used.
Perhaps the warnings merely need to be larger, to circumvent the
size advantage of the advertiser's message.
The resultant findings of concerted research into the best means
of effectively informing the public of the hazards of smoking, and
persuading consumers to abandon the habit, would help pro-ban
advocates to achieve their goals without offending the tenets of the
first amendment. While infringement of free speech appears to be
276. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341.
277. Cigarette Firms Tripled Outlays for Ads in '70s, Denver Post, Sept. 4, 1981, at 69F.
278. Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Consumer Responses to Cigarette Health
Information 7 (1979).
279. Lorillard 80 F.T.C. 455, 458 (1972), aff'd 527 F.2d 1115 (1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 911 (1976).
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of little concern to them, at least in comparison to the evil they
combat, research findings currently available indicate that the proper
approach to their goal, like the goal of the first amendment, is more
speech, not less.
